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Sectarian violence in the Middle East has continued to rise amid regional turmoil 
and transition. Though violence perpetuated along sectarian identities has occurred at 
times during the Middle East’s long history, it is not a constant or normal state of events. 
This thesis explains the rise in contemporary sectarian violence through comparative 
analysis and literature on Middle Eastern sectarianism and ethnic violence theory. This 
thesis has identified four primary independent variables as contributing factors to the 
dependent variable of sectarian violence. Three primary independent variables heightened 
the saliency of sectarian identity and regional sectarian tensions: identity group 
grievances, elite instrumentalization, and the regional context of the proxy war between 
Saudi Arabia and Iran. State collapse, the fourth and most critical variable, then 
transforms sectarian tensions into sectarian violence due to the political, economic, and 
security vacuums created. This conclusion is demonstrated by comparing sectarian 
violence in Bahrain and Yemen. Though Bahrain and Yemen share the first three 
variables (grievances, instrumentalization, and regional context), they diverge on the 
forth variable, state collapse. As a result, Yemen, which has experienced state collapse, 
has escalating sectarian violence, while Bahrain has failed to experience sectarian 
violence due to a robust and capable state apparatus.  
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1. Major Research Question 
This thesis seeks to examine what has caused the recent rise in Islamic sectarian 
violence in the Middle East. Since the early 2000s, violence perpetrated along sectarian 
lines has been sharply rising.1 According to Pew Research, “Globally, sectarian violence 
took place in nearly one-in-five of the world’s countries in 2012 (18%), up from 8% in 
2007,” and “the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) was the most common region for 
sectarian violence; half of all countries in the region in 2012 experienced this type of 
violence.”2 Thus, the focus of this research is to understand why sectarian identity, 
specifically Shi’a/Sunni Muslims, has become a source of violence, and why this has 
become a recent phenomenon. An important caveat to highlight in this research is that 
motivations for committing acts of violence are often not singularly focused. However, 
there is still ample evidence, based on the nature of targeting, violence, and rhetoric 
espoused, to conclude that sectarian identities have greatly impacted violence in the 
Middle East for the past decade and a half. 
2. Significance of the Research Question 
This thesis is significant because it strives to understand identity politics in the 
Middle East and specifically what drives these identities into violent interactions. 
Understanding the cause of sectarian violence can shape policies of international actors, 
better facilitate conflict resolution, and can shed light on the underlying issues that are 
fueling identity politics in the Middle East. Specifically, this research may assist the 
United States, which is an influential yet external actor, in forming better policy decisions 
and alliance relationships in order to promote lasting solutions and regional stability.  
                                                 
1 Angelina E. Theodorou, “Key Findings About Growing Religious Hostilities around the World,” 




This paper is also significant because it attempts to contribute to the greater body 
of literature on identity conflict. Much of the contemporary literature produced on 
sectarian violence in the MENA fails to utilize the theoretical frameworks developed 
through research on ethnic violence and test these frameworks with sectarian violence. 
Hopefully, this thesis can add to the literature on identity conflict by applying ethnic 
conflict theory and contemporary sectarian scholarship to explanations for sectarian 
violence in the Middle East. This may then provide a comparative basis for evaluating 
future identity conflicts outside the traditional bounds of ethnicity.  
Lastly, this research is significant and necessary because the recent rigidity of 
divisions along sectarian lines is a dangerous source of conflict that may have long-
standing implications. As Marc Lynch, the director of the Project on Middle East 
Political Science (POMEPS) suggested, “Political responses to identity conflict become 
far more difficult after they have been successfully mobilized—especially under 
conditions of state failure, uncertainty, violence, and fear.”3 Thus, understanding how to 
evaluate and perhaps even resolve these conflicts is time-critical. Evidence also suggests 
that these sectarian tensions may have already escaped the control of local governments, 
potentially creating a larger regional or global challenge.4 As author Gregory Gause 
points out, there is also real risk in “fanning anti-Shi’a sentiment in the Arab world,” 
because “this directly supports the world view of extremist Sunni Salafi jihadists” groups. 
The Salafist or Islamist narrative can then turn otherwise mild regional or local political 
conflicts into extreme and violent expressions of religious sectarianism.
5
 Additionally, as 
conflicts turn more violent or extremist, the damage created and blood shed can have 
lasting impacts on communities, creating deep-felt sentiments and degrading hopes of 
unity or reconciliation. 
                                                 
3 Marc Lynch, “The Entrepreneurs of Cynical Sectarianism,” in The Politics of Sectarianism 
(Washington, DC: Elliott School of International Affairs, 2013), 5. 
4 Irm Haleem, “Creating Frankensteins: The Taliban Movement of Pakistan,” Perspectives on 
Terrorism 2, no. 5 (2008): 15. 
5 Gregory Gause, “Saudi Arabia: Iraq, Iran, the Regional Power Balance, and the Sectarian Question,” 
Strategic Insights 6, no. 2 (2007): 5. 
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3. Methodology 
To answer the major research question, why contemporary sectarian violence 
exists in the Middle East, four hypotheses have been considered as possible explanations 
and these hypotheses then evaluated through two comparative case studies. The four 
hypotheses tested for explanatory capacity are the ancient hatreds theory, the elite 
instrumentalism theory, the proxy war theory, and the state collapse theory. The two 
comparative case studies are Bahrain and Yemen, chosen because one location, Yemen, 
has exhibited sectarian violence despite both nations having ongoing sectarian tensions. 
Ultimately, the conclusions drawn from the comparative case studies suggest that not one 
of the four hypotheses best explain sectarian violence. Instead, sectarian violence is best 
explained as the product of a process where sectarian tensions are transformed into 
violence. The creation of sectarian tensions occurs through a combination of local 
grievances, the agency of actors, and the impact of the current rivalry between Saudi 
Arabia and Iran. These sectarian tensions can then lead to sectarian violence during the 
turmoil, competition, and security dilemmas caused by the collapse of state capacity. In 
other words, this thesis will explain the dependent variable (DV) of sectarian violence by 
presenting four independent variables (IVs): grievances (the issues identity groups 
mobilize behind), local agency (instrumentalization of sectarian identity by elites), 
regional context (the impact of the proxy wars and rivalry between Saudi Arabia and 
Iran) and state collapse. This thesis proposes that the IVs of grievances, agency, and 
regional context are present in the creation of sectarian tensions, while state capacity is 
the critical variable that facilitates sectarian violence. 
Comparative analysis serves as the primary method to demonstrate the 
conclusions of this thesis. Bahrain and Yemen make for good comparative case studies 
because both locations have similarities that lend them susceptible to sectarian tensions 
and conflict. Bahrain and Yemen both have sizable Shi’a populations, 55–75% in the 
case of Bahrain, and 35–40% in the case of Yemen.6 The Shi’a populations in both 
                                                 
6 Justin Gengler, “Ethnic Conflict and Political Mobilization in Bahrain and the Arab Gulf” (PhD diss., 
University of Michigan, 2011), 53, http://hdl.handle.net/2027.42/89701.; “Mapping the Global Muslim 
Population,” Pew Research Center, May 15, 2015, http://www.pewforum.org/2009/10/07/mapping-the-
global-muslim-population/. 
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nations have very strong historical claims and identities, which contribute to their 
perceptions of legitimacy. In Bahrain, the Shi’a claim to be the original indigenous 
inhabitants of the island, referring to themselves as Baharna,7 and suggesting that Sunnis 
on the island are “foreign usurpers.”8 This historical identity has contributed largely to 
Bahraini Shi’as’ historical myth-making and sense of identity. Similarly, in Yemen, and 
to an even deeper extent, the historical significance of the Zaydi Shi’as can be traced to 
their Imamate in Northern Yemen, which existed for more than a thousand years.9 The 
Zaydi Imamate was only conquered in the 1960s; a recent enough memory that still 
contributes to Zaydi identity and myth-making. Thus, in both Bahrain and Yemen, a 
strong sense of religious and territorial identity bolsters feelings of legitimacy and 
grievances.  
Yemen and Bahrain do differ on some key aspects that at first may appear to 
present some challenges to comparison. The most obvious differences are geographical 
and material discrepancies. Yemen is home to about 27.5 million people,10 and is one of 
the most gun-prolific nations in the world.11 Yemen is a relatively large territory—
roughly the size of California turned on its side—and comprises geography varying from 
rugged mountains in the north to harsh deserts in the south. Yemen is also “one of the 
driest, poorest and least developed countries in the world.”12 It ranked 154th on the 
United Nations Development Program (UNDP) Multidimensional Poverty Index and 
                                                 
7 Laurence Louër, Transnational Shia Politics: Religious and Political Networks in the Gulf (New 
York Columbia University Press, 2008), 23. 
8 Kristin Smith Diwan, “Royal Factions, Ruling Strategies, and Sectarianism in Bahrain “ in Sectarian 
Politics in the Persian Gulf, ed. Lawrence G. Potter (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014), 144. 
9 Khaled  Fattah, “Yemen: Sectarianism and the Politics of Regime Survival,” in Sectarian Politics in 
the Persian Gulf, ed. Lawrence G. Potter (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014), 209. 
10 “Countries in the World by Population (2016),” World Population Prospects, May 15, 2016,  
http://www.worldometers.info/world-population/population-by-country/. 
11 Philip Alpers and Marcus Wilson, “Guns in Bahrain: Gun Ownership and Possession,” The 
University of Sydney, May 16, 2016,  
http://www.gunpolicy.org/firearms/compare/14/gun_owner_licensing/204. 





 out of 173 on the 2015 UNDP Human Resource Development Report.13 In contrast, 
Bahrain is a hot, flat, island in the North Arabian Gulf, about 3.5 times the size of 
Washington, DC, or roughly the same size as the San Francisco Bay. Bahrain has very 
strict gun laws14 and has a population of only about 1.4 million people.15 Bahrain is 
ranked 45
th
 on the Human Development Index and their Gross National Index is almost 
11 times more than Yemen’s.16 
These differences certainly reduce similarities between the two nations, but 
considering the variables that are being held in juxtaposition, these differences do not 
reduce their comparative capacity. Neither nation has a long history of sectarian conflict, 
but both still have Shi’a communities that hold deep-seated grievances. In fact, sectarian 
conflict in Yemen’s history has been described as “very unusual,” despite Yemen now 
dealing with sectarian violence.17 Both Bahrain and Yemen have had strong leadership 
figures capable of instrumentalization (President Ali Abdullah Saleh in Yemen and King 
Hamad al-Khalifa in Bahrain). Both nations have had, and continue to experience, 
tremendous pressure and involvement from Saudi Arabia, and both are immersed in the 
regional contestation between Saudi Arabia and Iran. Thus, the differing factors between 
these nations are most acutely manifested in these nations’ state capacity, which only 
serves to highlight the impact of state collapse in Yemen and state forte in Bahrain, and 
further emphasizes the casual value of state capacity. Thus, while Bahrain and Yemen are 
unique, for the purpose of this research, they offer valuable comparative capacity. 
                                                 
13 “Human Development Reports,” UNDP, May 15, 2016, 
http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/2015_human_development_report.pdf. The Multidimensional Poverty 
Index is “calculated based on data on deprivations in education, health and living standards from ICF 
Macro Demographic and Health Surveys, United Nations Children’s Fund Multiple Indicator Cluster 
Surveys and some national household surveys.”  
14 Alpers and Wilson, “Guns in Bahrain: Gun Ownership and Possession.” 
15 World Population Prospects, “Countries in the World by Population (2016).” 
16 UNDP, “Human Development Reports.”  
17 Fattah, “Yemen: Sectarianism,” 207. 
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B. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This thesis attempts to uniquely examine the complexities of sectarianism in the 
Middle East by uniting scholarship on both ethnic and sectarian conflicts; individually, 
each section of scholarship is informative, but combined, it can be explanatory. Literature 
on contemporary sectarianism fails to adequately explain the difference between 
incidents of sectarian tension and that of sectarian violence, a discrepancy this thesis 
finds necessary to differentiate. The literature on ethnic violence purports the identity of 
ethnicity itself to be a critical component to causing violence, thus degrading the 
facilitative capacity of other identities like sectarian, tribal, or ideological. The following 
literature review provides an understanding of how sectarianism was created and became 
an important source of tension and violent action in the modern Middle East. Primarily, 
the contemporary literature on sectarianism is very good at explaining why sectarian 
tension, but not violence, exists in the Middle East, while literature on ethnic violence 
adds a more theoretical framework to understanding how identity tensions are 
transformed into violence. The following literature review will evaluate four hypothesis 
of sectarian violence by combining concepts from literature on ethnic conflict and 
contemporary literature on sectarianism. Though some of authors that will be presented 
have explained ethnic or sectarian conflict by combining certain elements of these 
hypotheses, each hypothesis will be considered independently for simplification and 
organization. As each hypothesis is presented, it will be made clear why, independently, 
each has value, but alone is not explanatory. The rest of the thesis will be dedicated to 
presenting the thesis’s main argument, which will serve to provide a more encompassing 
and explanatory account of sectarian violence in the Middle East. 
1. Hypothesis 1: Primordialism 
Primordialists prescribe to the concept that “conflict between two ethnic groups is 
inevitable because of unchanging, essential characteristics of the members of these 
categories.”18 This belief suggests that conflict between ethnic groups, or for the purpose 
                                                 
18 James D Fearon and David D Laitin, “Violence and the Social Construction of Ethnic Identity,” 
International Organization 54, no. 04 (2000): 847. 
 7 
of this research, religious groups, is a defining part of that group’s identity, and that the 
antagonism toward another group has existed since the identity was first created. Thus, 
the concept of ancient hatreds is not just a connection to the cultural history of a group, 
but it implies continuity to cultural hatreds, passed down among generations, and 
activated as a part of current conflicts.19 Furthermore, sectarianism has often been 
described as a defining characteristic of less developed, “unmodern” nations, as it stands 
in direct contrast to the concepts of nationalism and pluralism.20 The scholar, Ussama 
Makdisi, suggested that “the [Western] secularist paradigm insists that religious feelings, 
beliefs, culture, and passions are insidiously persistent and immutable; sectarianism, 
therefore, is almost always identified as a problem affecting less developed countries.”21 
The labeling of sectarianism as an ancient hatred and a characteristic of less developed 
nations truly misrepresents the complex, nuanced, and contextual components of societal 
divisions and violence. In fact, religious groups are often described as “irreconcilably 
different, as inherently violent, and as incorrigibly hostile to [another] group’s collective 
identity.”22 This primordial definition simply generalizes religious antagonism as an 
irreconcilable problem instead of historically contextualizing and explaining each episode 
of violence. 
In the context of the Middle East, the ancient hatreds hypothesis suggests that the 
current conflict between Shi’a and Sunni Muslims is simply an extension of their ancient 
antagonism. The theory purports that the historical root of this division, which can been 
traced back to a major argument over the decision of who should lead the Muslim umma 
(community) after the death of the Prophet Muhammad, has created a long standing and 
consistent animosity between the groups. Shi’ites believed the leader of the umma, the 
caliph, should have been a descendent from Muhammad’s bloodline, specifically his son-
                                                 
19 Robert D Kaplan, Balkan Ghosts: A Journey through History (New York: Random House, 1993), 
xxi. 
20 Ussama Makdisi, “Reconstructing the Nation-State: The Modernity of Sectarianism in Lebanon,” 
Middle East Report 200, no. 200 (1996): 24. 
21 “Understanding Sectarianism,” ISIM Newsletter 8 (2001): 19. 
22 Ibid. 
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in-law, Ali.23 Sunnis, alternatively, believe the caliph should have been a leader chosen 
by the umma, not predetermined through heritage.24 This split of rightful community 
leadership has indeed resulted in differences of practice and systems of belief between 
Sunnis and Shi’a for centuries, and undeniably, times of conflict. Primordialists therefore 
have concluded that the initial fissure between Sunnis and Shi’ites has caused a long 
standing conflict, of which current sectarianism is just a contemporary manifestation. 
This understanding of ancient hatreds has influenced the analysis of sectarianism and 
ethnic conflict among policy makers, journalists, and even academics, leading some to 
believe that heterogeneous societies are particularly conflict-prone because of their ethnic 
or religious tensions, antagonism, and diverse makeup.25 
The concept of primordialism has largely been disputed and proven as an 
incomplete explanation by the majority of modern presiding literature on ethnic and 
religious violence. Primordialism cannot explain why sectarian tensions erupt into 
violence when they do, or what accounts for times of relative stability between Sunni and 
Shi’a communities. Furthermore, the theory is unable to explain why Shi’a and Sunnis 
have allied together against other common enemies, as this cooperation would contradict 
the edicts of their own ancient hatred. For example, during the Iran-Iraq war from 1980–
89, Iraqi Shi’a “largely upheld nationalism rather than their sectarian loyalty” and fought 
in opposition to the Shi’a regime of Iran.26 Furthermore, Laitin and Fearon, authors on 
ethnic violence, discovered that it does not appear “to be true that a greater degree of 
ethnic or religious diversity—or indeed any particular cultural demography—by itself 
makes a country more prone to civil war.”27 In fact, Laitin discovered that heterogeneous 
societies can and do coexist more often than they are in conflict.28 Even when conflict 
                                                 
23 Mike Shuster, “The Origins of the Shiite-Sunni Split,” National Public Radio (NPR), February 12 
2007, http://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2007/02/12/7332087/the-origins-of-the-shiite-sunni-split. 
24 Ibid. 
25 James D Fearon and David D Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War,” American Political 
Science Review 97, no. 01 (2003): 75. 
26 Dilip Hiro, The Longest War: The Iran-Iraq Military Conflict (New York: Routledge, 1991), 108. 
27 Fearon and Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War,” 75. 
28 David D Laitin, Nations, States, and Violence (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 13–15, 136. 
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does exist in heterogeneous nations, explanatory factors beyond primordial hatreds prove 
more illuminating.  
Nonetheless, the importance of cultural myths, symbols, and emotions between 
societal groups does exist, and these aspects of identity are relevant for group unity. 
Understanding these “ancient hatreds” reveals the historical and mythical elements of 
identity that can be activated by instrumentalists and leaders to promote group 
antagonism and mobilization. Thus, ancient hatreds can provide a perception of depth to 
an identity, facilitating not only its mobilization but also its fortitude. Despite this, 
primordialism still does not explain why groups pursue violent expression of identity, or 
why it occurs at a particular time period. 
2. Hypothesis 2: Instrumentalism by Elite Manipulation  
Unlike the ancient hatreds theory, the instrumentalist theory supports the notion 
that identities are not innate and consistent, but rather constructed, and that particular 
“identity entrepreneurs can manufacture ethnic, racial, or religious identity for their own 
purposes.”29 This constructivist perspective on identity suggests two important ideas for 
this hypothesis: the notion that identity and culture are created, not innate, and that 
individuals can create these identities for their own gains. The concept of an individual 
actor purposefully using identity as a tool for gain is best described by the term 
“instrumentalization.” Furthermore, in the context of this paper, the elites and groups 
who instrumentalize sectarianism will be referred to as having “agency” in constructing 
the sectarian narrative and ultimately sectarian tensions. 
The theorist, Paul Brass, also supports constructivism and instrumentalization by 
suggesting that identity is not primordial or predetermined, but that it is socially and/or 
politically constructed, and therefore changeable.30 Additionally, he argues that the 
primary manipulators of identity are elites and that identity is derived from the 
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interactions or competition between ruling elites and elites of non-dominant ethnic 
groups.31 Essentially, Brass suggests that this competition and desire to appeal to an 
identity allows elites to “select, distort, and transform” the identity of a community.32 To 
expand, constructivists have suggested that elite instrumentalization can explain ethnic 
and religious violence, not just identity manipulation;33 that religious or ethnic violence is 
the result of political elite’s attempts to hold or acquire power;34 and that these elites 
purposefully manipulate along identity divisions when they feel their power is 
threatened.35 Laitin and Fearon also suggested that “ethnic violence occurs when political 
elites construct antagonistic ethnic identities in order to strengthen their hold on 
power.”36 VP Gagnon, another prominent constructivist also asserted that 
violent conflict along ethnic cleavages is provoked by elites in order to 
create a domestic political context in which ethnicity is the only politically 
relevant identity…[and that] endangered elites can fend off domestic 
challengers who seek to mobilize the population against the status quo, 
and can better position themselves to deal with future challenges.37 
Gagnon, and others like him, thus assert that sectarian violence is caused though the 
agency of individual actors in society who manipulate or instrumentalize identity for their 
own gain. 
Unlike ethnic constructivists who have drawn causal lines between identity 
entrepreneurs and ethnic violence, most contemporary literature on sectarianism does not 
quite make this leap. Instead, contemporary authors focus on instrumentalization to 
explain sectarian tensions or conflict, but not necessarily sectarian violence. Lawrence 
                                                 
31 Ibid.; Stuart J Kaufman, Modern Hatreds: The Symbolic Politics of Ethnic War (Ithaca, NY: 
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Potter whose edited volume details multiple case studies of Middle Eastern sectarianism 
concludes that sectarian conflict is promoted as a tactic of governments to “divide in 
order to rule.”38 Potter and other contemporary authors therefore see the rational agency 
of governments as one of the forces behind sectarianism, but do not expressly suggest 
that instrumentalization causes sectarian violence. Another contemporary author on 
sectarianism in the Middle East who strongly supports the notion of elite agency is Toby 
Matthiesen. Matthiesen focuses on domestic politics and believes sectarianism is caused 
by identity entrepreneurs who instrumentalize sectarianism to maintain their authority.39 
Matthiesen’s asserts that ruling Arabian Gulf elites manipulated the democratic 
grievances of the 2011 Arab Spring protestors into issues of sectarianism in order to 
repress the uprisings.40 Thus, Matthiesen is suggesting that elite instrumentalization of 
sectarianism was a willful tactic employed to repress Arab Spring contestations of 
authority. However, Matthiesen also fails to explain how or why these manipulated 
sectarian tensions do or do not amount to actual sectarian violence. Additionally, his 
thesis does well to explain sectarian conflict in the Gulf region, but fails to explain 
sectarianism in nations that may lack robust systems of patronage and religious authority. 
The idea of elites repressing challenges to their authority by instrumentalizing an 
identity is also shared by another contemporary author, Kristin Diwan, who suggested 
that “Sectarian strife is not simply the product of entrenched communal divisions; rather 
it is contingent upon choices made by the ruling elite.”41 Thus, not only does Diwan deny 
the theory of ancient hatreds, but she is also prescribing agency to sectarian tensions. 
Like Matthiesen, Diwan’s description of instrumentalization in Bahrain does well to 
describe why sectarian tensions exist, but fails to explain how these tensions can led to 
sectarian violence. 
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Many contemporary Middle Eastern authors also advocate that 
instrumentalization can be accomplished not just by the ruling elite, but also by important 
non-state actors. Matthiesen states that “Sectarianism was not just a government 
invention, but the result of an amalgam of political, religious, social, and economic elites 
who all used sectarianism to further their personal aims.”42 Fearon and Laitin, authors on 
ethnic conflict, also emphasize that “non-elites” can provoke violence and construct 
ethnic antagonisms, simply as a “result of individual strategic action.”43 This paper 
supports the notion that both ruling and non-ruling elites can effectively instrumentalize 
sectarianism and contribute to the creation of salient sectarian identities. Additionally, 
this thesis will interchange the terms “elites” with Hannibal Travis’s term “identity 
entrepreneurs,”44 because though the latter is a more encompassing term, the former is 
less cumbersome to the reader. 
Both ethnic and sectarian constructivist theories on identity conflict have 
limitations as explanations for contemporary sectarian violence in the Middle East. 
According to the scholarship on ethnic violence, if elite instrumentalization is responsible 
for identity based violence, then sectarian violence would be rampant throughout the 
Middle East, rather than limited to a few particular locations.45 Additionally, while 
contemporary sectarian scholarship does well to explain why elites instrumentalize 
sectarian identity, it does not adequately explain how this manipulation can lead to 
violence. It seems insufficient to suggest that widespread violent hatred can be created by 
elite instrumentalization without also explaining what factors allow a particular identity 
to be so salient or what structural aspects of the society exist that may precipitate 
violence. As expert Stuart Kaufman suggested, only focusing on the leaders and their 
ability to manipulate groups disregards the impact of grievances that make an identity 
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salient.46 Thus, elite instrumentalization must also take into account other variables, like 
grievances and state capacity, to adequately explain how sectarian violence is created. 
To be fair, many authors have attempted to combine elite instrumentalization with 
other factors to develop more sufficient explanations. For example, Stuart Kaufman states 
that while elites manipulate group identity, ethnic violence results only when elite 
instrumentalization is combined with a perceived threat environment and a historical 
context of symbolic myths.47 Oman Shahabudin McDoom also suggested that alone, elite 
manipulation was not an explanation for the Rwandan ethnic violence; when emotions of 
fear were combined with instrumentalization and structural opportunities, ethnic violence 
resulted.48 This thesis takes a similar approach to the contribution of instrumentalization. 
It is a very important variable in explaining why sectarianism has recently increased, but 
it is not the only variable that has contributed to the increase in sectarian violence in the 
Middle East. 
3. Hypothesis 3: The Proxy War 
The proxy war hypothesis is a contemporary explanation that purports that 
sectarianism in the Middle East is the result of the competition between Iran and Saudi 
Arabia for regional hegemony.
49
 A critical notion of the proxy war hypothesis is that both 
Saudi Arabia and Iran use proxy agents in neighboring countries to carry out their 
bidding and quest for regional control. Because this hypothesis is adhered to by many 
realists in both government and academia, this theory will be explored in detail. First, a 
more detailed explanation of the proxy war hypothesis will be provided, followed by the 
history of Iran and Saudi’s competition which gives background to the hypothesis. Then, 
the theoretical literature on proxy wars will be compared to the contemporary 
competition between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) and Iran and how the proxy 
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war hypothesis has explained sectarian violence in the Middle East will be detailed. 
Finally, both the shortcomings and applicability of this hypothesis will be discussed. 
Overall, the proxy war hypothesis contributes to this thesis because the competition 
between Iran and Saudi Arabia has provided the context in which sectarian identity has 
been be so salient. 
The proxy war hypothesis is a rational interpretation of the events of the Middle 
East, purporting that the “best framework for understanding the regional politics of the 
Middle East is as a cold war in which Iran and Saudi Arabia play the leading roles.”50 
This phrase, the “new Cold War” is useful both because it suggests the contest for 
regional hegemony between two balanced powers, Saudi and Iran, as a “realist 
geopolitical battle,”51 and as a reference to Malcolm Kerr’s, “the Arab Cold War,” of the 
1950s and 1960s, in which important regional players competed for power in the Middle 
East.
52
 Malcolm Kerr suggests that through proxy wars, the power projection of principle 
actors was “measured in their ability to affect domestic political struggles in neighboring 
states” and in which “non-state actors played major roles.”53 These two key components, 
power projection into other states’ domestic affairs and the participation of non-state 
actors (NSAs), make this “cold war” reference applicable to the current Middle Eastern 
conflict between Saudi Arabia and Iran. 
The proxy war hypothesis attributes agency to the state, not just to an individual 
or local group, in the increase of sectarian violence. The proxy war hypothesis suggests 
that rival states place “identity within the context of strategic interactions” and that 
“regimes invoke collective identities and norms in a competitive fashion to increase their 
power in the regional order and to protect themselves against similar bids by their 
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rivals.”54 In this definition, the collective identities and norms being invoked are 
sectarian, and the regimes competing are Iran and Saudi Arabia. This competition has 
therefore given both Saudi and Iran agency in the promulgation of sectarian violence. 
Their actions have been legitimized by their identity as a Sunni (Saudi Arabia) and a 
Shi’a (Iran) Islamic state, and carried out through their influence and involvement in the 
domestic affairs of neighboring states. Both nations have promoted both state and NSAs 
to compete in proxy battles in areas of conflict and/or instability. 
Before exploring the literature that supports the proxy war hypothesis, the 
historical context of this competition between Iran and Saudi Arabia will be described. 
The rivalry between Riyadh and Tehran has its roots in the foundation of Iran in 1979. 
The creation of the Islamic Republic of Iran stood as a direct challenge to the 
conservative Islamic monarchy, Saudi Arabia’s, claim of Islamic legitimacy.55 Each 
nation’s claim for legitimacy has been particularly caustic for the region because both 
nations Islamic claims fall along the Sunnis-Shi’ite divide.56 Thus, according to the proxy 
war hypothesis, while the three and a half decades since 1979 have been interspersed 
with varying degrees of rivalry, from hesitant coordination to open conflict, it has only 
been in the past decade or so that this competition has shaped the identity of the greater 
Middle East. 
The relationship between Saudi Arabia and Iran can be described as generally 
tense and hostile with brief periods of calm. The 1980s were continuously wrought with 
tension as the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) attempted to export the 
Iranian Islamic revolution into the Gulf region and as Saudi Arabia openly supported 
Saddam Hussain’s war effort against Iran in the Iran-Iraq War (1980–89).57 Furthermore, 
Islamic Republic openly encouraged disenfranchised Shi’a from Saudi Arabia’s Eastern 
Providence to riot against the Saudi monarchy, causing immediate concerns and hostility 
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between Iran and Saudi Arabia.58 The 1990s did see a short period of rapprochement 
between Riyadh and Tehran as Saddam Hussain’s invasion of Kuwait and his efforts to 
break into the world oil market damaged Saudi-Iraq relations and gave common cause to 
the Saudi-Iranian relationship.
59 
Yet, this short-lived period of understanding came to an 
abrupt end when U.S. troops marched into Baghdad in 2003. The invasion of Iraq in 2003 
disabled Iraq’s capacity to serve as the third leg on the Middle Eastern balance-of-power 
stool between Iraq, Iran, and Saudi Arabia—consequently heightening tensions and 
competition between Iran and KSA. Then, in 2005, the election of Iran’s Mahmoud 
Ahmadinejad ushered in nearly ten years of a hardline and openly hostile Iranian 
president, a far cry from the “reform era” of Ahmadinejad’s predecessor, President 
Mohammad Khatami.
60
 As the landscape of the Middle East began to change, so too did 
the relationship between the two dominate powers in the Middle East. 
Throughout the start of the twenty-first century, the stability in the Middle East 
only became more precarious as the political vacuums left in Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, and 
finally Yemen, invited regional intervention and competition between Saudi Arabia and 
Iran.
61 
Saudi Arabia and Iran were presented with new opportunities to extend their 
regional power and influence in the wake instability caused by the Iraqi civil war and 
Arab Spring uprisings. The fall of Saddam Hussein and the Afghani Taliban ousted two 
key rivals on Iran’s boarders, providing favorable conditions for the expansion of Iran’s 
influence into the Middle East.
62 
Furthermore, the Arab Spring, in part, mobilized 
minority Shi’a populations in predominately Sunni nations, threatening Sunni regime’s 
stability and heightening Iran’s potential influence. Thus, the recent instability caused by 
revolution and war in the Middle East has ushered in a new and more pronounced chapter 
of competition between Saudi Arabia and Iran. 
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The history of the conflict between Saudi and Iran makes relevant the literature on 
proxy wars because the literature can explain how and why identity is embedded in 
strategic interactions between competing nations. Andrew Mumford, in his book, Proxy 
Warfare, defines proxy wars as “the indirect engagement in a conflict by third parties 
wishing to influence its strategic outcome. They are constitutive of a relationship between 
a benefactor, and their chosen proxies, who are the conduit for weapons, training, and 
funding from the benefactor.”63 In Mumford’s context, Saudi Arabia and Iran would be 
the benefactors of the proxy agents. Furthermore, the proxy war hypothesis suggests that 
these “interventions are undertaken ostensibly for reasons of maximizing interest, while 
at the same time minimizing risk.”64 Thus, when Saudi Arabia and Iran fund religiously 
motivated proxy groups, they employ a cost-efficient way to spread power and influence 
in the region. Mumford also suggests that proxy wars are typically conducted by states 
hoping to exploit localized events to create a “shift in the wider geopolitical 
environment,”65 a goal the proxy war hypothesis suggests Iran and KSA have. Similarly, 
authors Maoz and San-Akca have suggested in their study, “Rivalry and State Support of 
Non-State Armed Groups (NAGs),” that in conflict-torn environments, the state/NAG 
cooperation is an effective state tool to target a rival power directly or indirectly, and is 
particularly effective when the NAG and the state share a mutual rival target.66 Both 
Mumford and Maoz/Akca’s descriptions of proxy wars and state/non-state alliances 
provide a definitional foundation for the proxy war hypothesis. 
A state’s motivation to utilize proxy agents, a key component of the hypothesis, is 
explained by author Frederic Pearson. Pearson identifies six primary reasons a state 
would intervene in another country, three of which are relevant to the proxy war 
hypothesis: “protection of social groups, ideology, and regional power balances.”67 
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Mumford believes Pearson’s inclusion of ideology along with regional power balance is 
an incredibly important explanation for engaging in proxy wars, and that ideologies can 
shape and/or be intertwined with state interests.68 This conceptualization of proxy war 
engagement is important because it recognizes both the constructivist’s focus on the role 
of ideology as well as the realist’s belief in the importance of national interests (or 
power). Even Hans Morgenthau, an avowed classical realist, supports this entwinement 
of ideology and interest when he says that there has always been an important “interplay 
between ideology and power politics.”69 Morgenthau further suggests that “Ideologies 
have been an independent motivating force” and that, “[Ideology] does not respect 
national boundaries…It finds enemies and allies in all countries…regardless of the 
niceties of international law.”70 This acceptance of ideology’s role in proxy war conflict 
is directly applicable to this thesis because the proxy war hypothesis believes that Iran 
and Saudi Arabia’s national security interests have been informed by their ideological 
association to Shi’a and Sunni Islam. Helle Malmvig argues that both Saudi Arabia and 
Bahrain have accused local dissident groups of being under the control or influence of 
Iran (e.g., being a proxy for Iran), thus transforming a potentially local or political issue 
into a sectarian one.
71
 Malmvig concludes that, “The Sunni-Shi’a…rivalry…obviously 
serves to exacerbate sectarianism [and] makes ample room for the political 
instrumentalization of sectarian divides.”72 Additionally, Vali Nasr notes that “Saudi 
leaders say that the two things they won’t compromise on are their faith and their 
security. The first they aver is threated by Shiism, the second by Iran.”73 These authors 
make clear that in the proxy war hypothesis, religious ideology and national security 
interests have become intertwined, resulting in sectarianism as a key motivator of 
regional competition and in determining friend or foe. This correlation between sectarian 
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identity and national interests has led to the assumption that the ideology determines the 
alliance, rather than the alliance determining the ideology; for example, if a proxy group 
is Shi’a, they are assumed to be allied with Iran because of their common ideological 
adherence to Shiism. As will be expanded upon further when addressing the inadequacies 
of this hypothesis, this thesis suggests that there are fundamental flaws in the sweeping 
assumption of ideological alliances. 
The proxy war hypothesis has applied the existing literature on proxy wars to the 
historical competition between Saudi and Iran to deduce that current sectarian violence in 
the Middle East is a result of the proxy wars between Saudi and Iran. Gregory Gause 
repeatedly asserts that Saudi Arabia and Iran indirectly fight one another by sponsoring 
sectarian state and non-state actors to engage in proxy wars on the battlefields of 
weakened Arab states.
74
 Additionally, while Gause believes that “Saudi Arabia and Iran 
did not create the state weakness and sectarian identities in these countries, they are 
certainly taking advantage, [and] advancing their own interests in a classic balance of 
power game.”75 Gause sees an important “bottom-up” driving force behind sectarian 
violence, suggesting that sectarianism’s saliency is a result of proxy groups engaging in 
sectarian outbidding as they compete among each other for Saudi or Iran’s backing to 
gain legitimacy, recognition, and resources.76 This outbidding has consequently led to 
more extremist sectarian discourse and sectarian violence.77 Bassel Salloukh takes a more 
top-down approach to explaining the violence by suggesting that sectarian violence is 
simply a “spillover” or the result of the “realist geopolitical battle” between Saudi Arabia 
and Iran.
78 
Salloukh sees the contestation of power between KSA and Iran as facilitating 
elites’ instrumental use of sectarianism in domestic politics and allows local actors to 
disrupt popular, democratic uprisings into “veritable civil wars.”79 Similarly, Helle 
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Malmvig argues that the regional turmoil and violence caused by the Arab Spring and the 
Syrian Civil War has created a shift in regional foreign policies along sectarian lines as 
Iran and Saudi Arabia compete for power.
80 
Thus, though in different ways, these authors 
all argue that the contestation for power between Iran and Saudi explains sectarianism 
and sectarian violence in the Middle East. 
In summary, this section has detailed the history of tensions between KSA and 
Iran, the scholarly basis of the proxy war hypothesis, and how contemporary authors have 
used this hypothesis to explain sectarian violence in the Middle East. The following 
section will expand this discussion to address the limitations of the proxy war hypothesis 
in explaining sectarian violence, but will also suggest that the regional competition 
between Saudi and Iran has facilitated the saliency of sectarian identity. 
a. Limits of Explanatory Capacity of the Proxy War Hypothesis 
Discerning the validity of the proxy war hypothesis requires differentiating reality 
from perception when evaluating the power projection capacity of Iran and Saudi Arabia. 
The proxy war hypothesis has its limitations in explanatory value because of the actual 
limitations of Iranian and Saudi Arabian proxy sponsorship, and because contributing 
such agency to Iran and Saudi Arabia diminishes critical domestic politics that have 
greatly affected sectarianism within individual nations. 
An overreach of the proxy war hypothesis is its use as a general explanation for 
sectarian tensions, conflict, or violence, even in areas with limited Iranian or Saudi 
Arabian influence. Most authors agree that proxy agents have been impactful in 
contributing to sectarian violence in Iraq and Syria due to the conflict, instability, and 
state collapse there;
81
 however, it is highly debated as to how impactful the regional 
rivalry between KSA and Iran has been in causing sectarian conflict in other areas. 
Lebanon, Palestine, Yemen, Bahrain, and the Eastern provinces of Saudi Arabia, and to a 
lesser extent, even Kuwait, Afghanistan, and Pakistan, have also all been categorized as 
battle-grounds for Iran and Saudi’s regional competition. Unfortunately, this sweeping 
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generalization of what categorizes a “proxy war battle-ground” muddies connections of 
causality and does not allow for a clear distinction of direct or indirect involvement by 
KSA and Iran.
82 
If this important distinction is glossed over, the difference between state-
sponsored encouragement and state-sponsored armament, and between sectarian tensions 
and sectarian violence, is lost; the rivalry of Saudi Arabia and Iran is given far greater 
agency than this thesis will support. 
Figure 2 is a chart that depicts this more sweeping assumption of agency and 
shows alliances between Iran and Saudi Arabia and their supposed proxy groups. Figure 
3 simply maps the concentrations of Shi’a within the Middle East. 
 
Figure 1.  Sectarian Competition83 
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Figure 2.  Lines in the Sand: Shi’ites as a Percentage of the Muslim Population84 
The important takeaway from the two charts is in their juxtaposition. The 
implication made by Figure 2 and the proxy war hypothesis writ large, is that locations 
that have a large Shi’a population are also allied to Iran, and those that are predominantly 
Sunni are allied to Saudi Arabia. Thus, images such as Figure 2 emphasize the perception 
that the Middle East is either pro-Saudi or pro-Iranian, simply because of sectarian 
beliefs. This thesis finds the sectarian connection demonstrated by these figures to be an 
oversimplification that degrades the attributes of the proxy war hypothesis. 
Another key assumption made by the proxy war hypothesis is that Iran is a 
powerful regional hegemon that is capable of projecting its power throughout the Middle 
East. This assumption deserves scrutiny because arguably, contemporary sectarian 
conflicts have actually hampered Iran’s ability to project power and influence in the 
region. The sectarianization of the Middle East has caused Iran to fight to “maintain a 
diminishing sphere of influence rather than posing a rising challenge to the region.”85 
With Shi’a holding a minority status in the Middle East, the increase of sectarian based 
divisions is a losing proposition for Iran, a nation that espouses to be the defenders of 
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Shi’a throughout the world.86 Furthermore, as Iran’s capacity has diminished so too has 
their control over co-religionist groups. As Laurence Louër asserts, “the time is over 
when the Islamic Republic could claim unconditional allegiance from all the Shi’a 
Islamic movements. Hence the time is over when one could analyze them as mere proxies 
of Iranian foreign policy.”87 Similarly, Yemeni expert Peter Salisbury argues that 
characterizing the Yemeni Houthis as a “true proxy of Iran” that “shares Tehran’s wider 
goals, is to oversimplify the relationship involved and overstate the degree to which such 
claims can be substantiated.”88 Instead, Iran appears to have less capacity than the proxy 
war hypothesis would suggest. Lastly, Iran is competing in a region largely comprised of 
Sunnis and Sunni-run governments, and following a series of set-backs in Iraq, Syria, and 
Palestine, Iran’s actions may be more geared toward preserving their survival than 
offensively asserting power.89 
Iran and Saudi Arabia’s balance of power capacity is greatly reduced when the 
political landscape is painted as simply Shi’a versus Sunni. Consider that in the past, Iran 
has relied on non-Shi’a actors to exert its influence, like its sponsorship of Hamas in 
Palestine, its close ties to the Sunni government of Sudan, and even its support for the 
Egyptian Sunni Muslim Brotherhood’s candidate, Muhammad Morsi. Since the 
heightening of sectarian tensions, Iran has seen these alliances recede.90 Likewise for 
Saudi Arabia, “the extent that political tensions in the region become increasingly and 
rigidly sectarian, the Saudi government loses the flexibility necessary to both block and 
engage Teheran simultaneously.”91 Saudi Arabia also has a sizable minority Shi’a 
population within their own borders, a group whose stability is degraded as sectarianism 
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is heightened. Thus, to some extent, Saudi and Iran’s interests cannot be driven by 
religious ideology alone if they are to preserve their own survival and interests.92 
Though the Iranian and Saudi regional rivalry and sponsorship of proxy groups 
has existed for decades, the drastic increase in sectarianism and regional instability that 
followed the 2003 Iraq invasion and 2011 Arab Spring suggests that other factors have 
impacted sectarian violence in the region. Consider that as recent as 2006, Nasrallah, the 
head of Hezbollah, was found to be the “most admired world leader” and the Iranian 
president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, to be the “third most admired,” in an Arab Annual 
Public Opinion Survey conducted in the Sunni nations of Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, 
Morocco, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE).93 This fact suggests that 
even as late as 2006, fears of Iran, and the Shi’a threat more broadly, were not as 
pronounced as they would become in the years beyond 2011. 
Despite indications that other regional factors may have contributed to 
sectarianism, there still appears to be a “near-hysterical focus on the existential threat of a 
meddling Iran.”94 This threat has “served to alarm ordinary Sunnis throughout the Gulf, 
spreading anti-Shi’i sentiment even to places with little history of sectarian politics 
(Yemen and Kuwait) and countries home to marginal Shi’i populations (UAE and 
Qatar).”95 This fear has galvanized the proxy war hypothesis and has contributed to the 
belief Iran and Saudi Arabia have a plethora of proxy agents serving their interests and 
contributing to regional sectarian tensions and even violence. The proxy war hypothesis 
has also galvanized the assumption that there is “coherence of the ‘Sunni’ side of the 
conflict” in a “long-standing power struggle with Iran.”96 This over emphasis on the 
proxy war hypothesis to explain sectarianism in the Middle East has diminished the 
impacts of state collapse and elite instrumentalization on sectarian violence. Frederic 
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Wehrey eloquently summarizes, while “the Saudi-Iran rivalry and the Syria war have 
certainly heighted sectarian tensions in the Gulf… these factors are ultimately enablers, 
rather than root causes.”97 Thus, while the proxy war hypothesis can contribute to an 
understanding of sectarian conflict in the Middle East, overemphasizing the proxy war 
hypothesis diminishes recognition of other key variables that contribute to sectarian 
violence. 
The merits of the proxy war hypothesis follow Wehrey’s line of thinking—the 
rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia has contributed to the saliency of sectarian identity 
and provided critical contextualization for sectarian narrative building. The competition 
between the two nations has become a way in which conflict in the Middle East is 
perceived—it has created a sectarian lens in which tensions and violence are viewed. 
Furthermore, the influence and interference that does come from Saudi and Iran has 
contributed to conflict escalation. Steven Lobell and Philip Mauceri suggest that 
“transnational penetration and foreign meddling in domestic politics will be more 
effective against divided societies, becoming a battle-ground for outside powers, and 
thereby contributing to the escalation of ethnic conflict.”98 This phenomenon has clearly 
been seen in places of severe conflict such as Iraq and Syria. Thus, the division of 
societies along sectarian lines is further heightened with the external meddling of both 
Saudi Arabia and Iran, thereby escalating sectarianism and sectarian divisions within 
individual nations. Lastly, because of the potency of the proxy war hypothesis, 
instrumentalist have perpetuated the perception of Iran or Saudi’s influence to 
delegitimize local actors and emphasis their sectarian cleavages. In both case studies that 
will be presented, key leaders in Bahrain and Yemen have accused Shi’a dissidents of 
being proxy actors for Iran, a claim that in the current environment created by Iran and 
Saudi’s rivalry was very effective in delegitimizing opposition voices. While the proxy 
war hypothesis has provided key literature and analysis on the impacts of Saudi and 
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Iran’s rivalry on sectarian saliency and local politics, other structural factors, like state 
capacity, are also critical in determining how sectarian violence is actually mobilized. 
 
Figure 3.  Saudi Arabia Takes over the Middle East99 
 
Figure 4.  Iran Takes over the Middle East100 
These two images juxtapose the similar feelings of Saudi and Iranian influence in the 
Middle East, simply depending on the perspective. 
4. Hypothesis 4: The Collapsed State Theory 
The state collapse theory posits that the recent rise of sectarian violence in the 
Middle East has been the result of collapsed states. Characteristics of a collapsed state, 
such as the lack of economic stability, protection, law and order, and even basic 
                                                 
99 Sajjad Jafari, “Cartoon of Saudi Arabia as an Octopus in the Middle East,” in Professor A.L.I Word 
Press (Blog), posted January 2, 2016, https://professorali.com/. 
100 Robert Ariail, “Iran’s Tentacles,” Blog Spot, 2015, tonyphyrillas.blogspot.com  
 27 
resources, can perpetuate competition for power and the necessity for security and 
stability. Furthermore, the collapse of the state institutions degrades the importance of a 
national identity, providing space for new identity groups to become significant. This 
section defines the term “state collapse” and presents the state collapse hypothesis’ 
assumptions; the necessity of the state apparatus, the impact of the process of state 
collapse on society, and how identity groups become more salient during times of 
collapse. Finally, this section concludes by suggesting a limitation of the state collapse 
hypothesis on fully explaining the rise in sectarian violence in the Middle East. 
State collapse, failure, or weakness are all terms that vary in meaning based on the 
context and agenda in which they are being used for.101 This thesis will use the term 
“collapsed” or “collapsing” state to describe a state that lacks capacity or legitimacy. 
Thus, collapsed states are “no longer just those that face constraints in terms of resources 
and economic viability,”102 but states that no longer have political legitimacy, 
institutional capacity, or the ability to maintain protection of their borders and citizens.103 
Literature on state collapse assumes the necessity of the state apparatus. As author 
Sarah Phillips described, the concept of failed states has “trouble imagining the 
possibility that security can exist beyond—or despite—the formal state.”104 This 
perspective suggests a Hobbesian view of mankind—submission to a central authority is 
better than civil war because the nature of man is to be at war with one another.105 The 
collapsed state hypothesis therefore prescribes to the belief that a capable state, even an 
authoritarian state, can prevent man’s natural propensity toward competition and conflict. 
This line of logic therefore concludes that if a state ceases to function and degrades into a 
condition of collapse, conflict is possible, if not probable. This point is reflected by 
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writers on ethnic conflict like Lake and Rothchild, Stuart Kaufman, and Marc Ross, who 
all believe that the effects of a collapsing state, particularly one riddled with tensions and 
grievances, can be enough to produce violence.106 While this thesis certainly will not 
advocate authoritarian governance, it does agree with the conclusions that state capacity 
serves an important role in preventing anarchy and violence. 
This thesis utilizes the term “state collapse” instead of “state failure” in an effort 
to emphasize the importance of the process of collapse rather than the static condition of 
failure. In other words, it is the destabilizing impact of the transition, from a weak state to 
a collapsed state, which has the greatest impact in the creation of violent hostilities and 
conflict. As the state begins to collapse, government support becomes increasingly 
partisan, security vanishes, government spending on essential resources is reduced, and 
the state’s legitimacy crumbles.107 Additionally, Beverly Crawford argues that in states 
where old social contracts “guided the allocation of political and economic resources” 
along ethnic or religious lines, state collapse can increase the “odds of cultural conflict 
and even violence.”108 Barry Posen’s security dilemma also focuses on the impact of 
state collapse by suggesting that when a state is “confronted with structural collapse, one 
ethnic group cannot distinguish defensive from offensive security measures taken by the 
other group to protect itself in the ‘emerging anarchy.’”109 Posen argues that state 
collapse precipitates a condition of chaos and anarchy that causes groups to resort to 
violence by attacking other groups preemptively,110 claiming that “the drive for security 
in one group is so great that it produces near-genocidal behavior toward neighboring 
groups.”111 The idea of the security dilemma is also referred to by Stuart Kaufman as the 
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“spiral of insecurity”—groups compete for their own self-defense when the state is 
unable to defend them.112 Thus, what contributes most greatly to sectarian or ethnic 
violence is not how strong a state was prior to collapse or even how weak it becomes 
after collapse. Instead, it is the breaking down of the state’s contracts, legitimacy, 
capacity, and protection, which occur during the process of state collapse that facilitates 
violence. 
The state collapse hypothesis also argues that identity divisions become more 
salient in times of crises because people look toward known identity groups for 
protection and to gain authority or control. When the state collapses, security, capacity, 
and legitimacy are diminished, creating space for competition and disorder that 
necessitates group cohesion. People mobilize “looking for redress along ethnic, religious, 
or linguistic lines,”113 allowing historical grievances and in-group and out-group 
dynamics to redefine society.114 These identity divides are further fueled as power 
vacuums, created by the absence of state authority, present competitive opportunities for 
secession, autonomy, or control.115 Omar McDoom’s research on Rwandan genocide 
asserts that identities become more salient in threat environments and lead to in-group 
bias and out-group negativity.116 For McDoom, it is the psychology of threat that creates 
emotions that drive societal polarizations.117 A collapsing state produces an environment 
of threat, competition, and therefore, identity group saliency. 
A weakness of the state collapse theory is that it fails to elucidate which identity 
societies will divide along during times of state collapse. In other words, though the state 
collapse theory can predict a commensurate collapse of national identity, it cannot predict 
a commensurate rise of another identity. As described in a 2013 Middle Eastern Security 
Report, “state weakness tends to encourage saliency with identities that do not align with 
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the nation-state, such as sect, ethnicity, or tribe.”118 As the state becomes weak, the 
identity that ties people to the state does, as well. Thus, explaining what has caused the 
rise in sectarian violence in the Middle East can only be partially answered by the state 
collapse theory. The state collapse hypothesis can facilitate an explanation for the rise in 
violence, but other variables, such as those presented in the previous hypotheses, are 
necessary to explain the rise of sectarianism. This limitation of state collapse therefore 
suggests that this thesis argument, which combines the four hypotheses explored, is better 
poised to explain the recent rise in sectarian violence than any single hypothesis in 
isolation. 
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II. BAHRAIN CASE STUDY 
The Bahrain case study will focus on exploring the first three IVs, grievances, 
instrumentalism, and the proxy war, and how these have specifically affected sectarian 
sentiment and tensions in the country of Bahrain. Though Bahrain has had a long history 
of sectarian divisions, the small island nation has coexisted peacefully with only a few 
intermittent exceptions. However, in 2011, the Arab Spring brought forth a wave of 
public grievances, transforming an otherwise stable country into one of widespread 
protests and disruption. The government of Bahrain (GoB) responded to these protests by 
emphasizing sectarian identities as a method of dividing and delegitimizing protestors 
and reducing the popular, cross-sectarian support of the movement. The context of the 
Iran/Saudi Arabian rivalry was also a very salient and important part of Bahrain’s 
sectarian discourse as the proximity and history of Bahrain to both countries has made 
influences by both more impactful. This chapter will focus on the three IVs—grievances, 
instrumentalization, and regional contextualization—to explain Bahrain’s sectarian 
tensions, but will do so largely within the context of the Arab Spring uprisings in 2011. 
By exploring the IVs of grievances, instrumentalization, and the contextualization of the 
regional proxy war, it will become clear how sectarian identity became mobilized and 
activated in Bahrain. However, unlike Yemen, because Bahrain’s state remained strong 
and capable, these sectarian tensions did not escalate into sectarian violence. 
A. HISTORY OF GRIEVANCES 
Bahrain has a long history of a Sunni minority ruling over a Shi’a majority, a 
narrative that has, in part, defined the nation. The small island of Bahrain is only about 
3.5 times larger than the city of Washington, DC and is home to some 1.3 million 
inhabitants.119 Of these 1.3 million inhabitants, over half are foreign nationals who live in 
Bahrain on work visas and without full citizenship rights.120 It is currently estimated that 
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between 60–75% of Bahraini’s are Shi’a—a wide estimation because no official census 
has been permitted to ask this question since 1941.121 
Originally, Bahrain was inhabited by Shi’a Arabs and governed as a dependency 
of the Persian Empire (Iran) until a Bani Utub Sunni tribe from the Arabian Peninsula, 
headed by the Al-Khalifa family, conquered the island in 1784.122 From that point on, a 
system of tribal patronage has resulted in the “haves and have not’s,” and has been the 
primary source of grievances in Bahrain. While the Al-Khalifa family is Sunni, 
throughout its ruling history, “its allies [have included] prominent tribal and merchant 
families from Sunni and Shi’a, Arab and Persian communities.”123 Thus, Shi’a and Sunni 
divides have not always been as impactful as they are today. 
Over the last two centuries, and every decade since 1920,124 opposition 
movements have not simply been Shi’a uprisings, but rather have been generated from 
transnational ideologies. Popular ideologies like communism, Arab Nationalism, secular 
nationalism, and democratic revolution have all instigated cross-sectarian and cross-class 
political mobilization against the Al-Khalifa regime.125 For example, in both the 1950s 
and the 1970s, nationalist movements united leftists and nationalists in both the Shi’a and 
Sunni communities against the regime.126 The 1950s saw the creation of a cross-sectarian 
social movement and the formation of the Higher Executive Committee that openly 
challenged the ruler, Sheikh Salman bin Hamad Al-Khalifa, and his longstanding British 
advisor, Sir Charles Belgrave.127 Then, two decades later, a voting coalition was formed 
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by the liberal People’s Block and the more conservative Sunni Religious Block during 
the 1973 parliamentary elections.128 
This cross-sectarian cooperation, particularly in 1973, challenged the historical 
systems of patronage and division the Al-Khalifa family had been using to maintain their 
power base. In fact, the 1973 parliamentary Sunni—Shi’a voting coalition was so 
powerful, the ruling family dissolved the parliament and another one would not be 
created until 2002.129 After the parliament was reinstated in 2002, the King took 
unilateral action to cripple its capacity to govern, once more erupting protests that 
involved a broad range of political societies and “collectively spanned the ideological and 
religious spectrum.”130 The examples provided demonstrate that the constituency of 
Bahrain has repeatedly felt aggrieved by the ruling elite, but that the identity lines upon 
which these grievances fell has changed with contemporary factors that have rendered 
some identities more salient than others, at different times. Thus, these details put to rest 
any theories that ancient hatreds between Shi’a and Sunni have impacted the current 
sectarian discourse in Bahrain. 
1. Grievances, Historical and Contemporary 
The grievances that comprised the basis of the Arab Spring protests in Bahrain 
indeed had some distinct cross-sectarian commonalities, but there have also been clearly 
held grievances in the Shi’a community because of the systematic exclusion and 
marginalization Bahraini Shi’a have experienced politically, socially, and economically 
since the 1980s. Shi’a, in particular, make up a larger portion of lower class in Bahrain as 
compared to Sunnis, and have felt aggrieved because of sectarian discrimination in the 
job market, shortages of affordable housing, and general unemployment. Additionally, 
Shi’a have been excluded from public sector jobs, particularly in areas of national 
defense, and have had their limited voting rights diminished though gerrymandering and 
Sunni naturalization techniques. 
                                                 




The exclusion of Shi’a in Bahrain politically and economically became more 
firmly entrenched following the regional politicization of Shi’a as a result of the 1979 
Iranian revolution. Then in 1981, an Iranian-supported coup plot by Bahraini Shi’a, who 
were associated with the Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain (IFLB), was 
uncovered and drastically altered the perception of Shi’a and their relationship with the 
ruling family.131 This event, along with the general fear of Shi’a mobilization as a result 
of Iran attempting to export their revolution, encouraged the GoB to excluded Shi’a from 
key public sector jobs and politics. An important nuance to understand in Bahrain, and 
elsewhere in the Arab Gulf, is that “public-sector employment does not lead to political 
allegiance,” instead, “political allegiance leads to public-sector employment.”132 This key 
fact is largely why Bahrain’s Shi’a have been discriminated more so politically and 
economically than their Sunni counterparts, but also why there has been cross-sectarian 
disgruntlement over patronage, corruption, and employment opportunities. A Sunni who 
disagrees with the administration is just as unlikely as a Shi’a who disagrees to get a job 
in the public-sector. However, statistically, Bahraini Sunnis are more inclined to support 
the regime, thus supporting the perception of discrimination along sectarian lines.133 
Either way, the result is that Sunnis are nearly 40% more likely to be employed in 
Bahrain’s public sector, even after considering other relevant individual factors.134 
Additionally, not only are Shi’a excluded from public-sector jobs more readily, but it also 
is more common for them to hold lower-level jobs when they are employed, both in the 
public and private sectors.135 This makes Bahraini Shi’a more likely to be competing 
with the foreign labor force than their Sunni counterparts, adding to Shi’a’s anger at the 
government’s failure to reform job growth opportunities for Bahraini citizens and hold 
businesses accountable for employing cheap foreign labor.136 
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The exclusion of Shi’a from the public sector, particular the security forces, grew 
steadily throughout the 1990s. From 1994–1999 the regime faced its longest uprising to 
date when citizens, the majority of whom were Shi’a, demanded “the return of the 
parliament, the end of the state of emergency, and measures to create jobs.”137 The result 
of the uprising was further entrenched distrust of the Shi’a population and a 
reinforcement of the regime’s sectarian preferences in public employment. Up until that 
time, young Shi’a men heavily relied on the armed services for employment, despite 
being relegated to positions of non-commissioned officers (NCOs) and foot soldiers.138 
The inclusion of Shi’a in the public sector, and of Shi’a and Sunnis working closely 
together, was viewed as threatening to the GoB. Thus, the regime’s sectarian profiling 
has left the four major security bodies of Bahrain—the Bahrain Defense Force, the 
National Guard, the police forces in the Ministry of Interior, and the National Security 
Agency—almost entirely comprised of Bahraini Sunni and foreign mercenaries, and 
headed almost exclusively by Al-Khalifa family members.139 Within the NSA alone, 
which in 2009 employed 1000 people, 64% were non-Bahrainis, and of the 36% that 
were Bahraini, only 4% were Shi’a.140 Generally speaking, Shi’a are excluded from the 
security services and from positions of leadership when they are employed in these 
organizations, and foreigners from southeast and south Asia account for large numbers, 
and even in some organizations like the Special Security Force Command (SSFC), the 
majority of the servicemen.141 
In addition to the exclusion of Shi’a from the security apparatus in Bahrain, the 
already limited opportunities for Shi’a and Sunnis to vote have been skewed to reduce the 
voting capacity of Shi’a populations. The Lower House of Parliament, the elected body 
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of representatives (as opposed to the Upper House which is appointed by the King), had 
as of 2010, 45% Shi’a and 55% Sunni representatives.142 Considering the fact that Shi’a 
make up a clear majority of Bahrain’s citizens (at least 55–75%), that they are 
represented with a percentage less than 50% suggests efforts have been made to tip the 
balance in favor of Sunnis. One explanation for the Sunni majority in Parliament is due to 
the efforts of hardliners in the Khalifa regime who began a policy of Sunni 
gerrymandering and Sunni citizen naturalization to try and increase Sunni political 
constituents and the Sunni population in general. The details of these efforts were 
released in the infamous al-Bandar Report, a detailed 216-page document written by 
Saleh al-Bandar, a British citizen of Sudanese descent who worked in the Royal Court 
Affairs Ministry.143 The report was sent to the Bahrain Center for Human Rights and 
subsequently publically released in 2006, creating political upheaval.144 This single 
document “revealed an elaborate [and secret] plan to rig elections through 
gerrymandering techniques and by supporting Salafist and Muslim Brotherhood 
candidates.”145 Furthermore, it detailed a coordinated plan of rapid naturalization of 
Sunnis from Jordan, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Yemen146 and a Shi’i-to-Sunni 
religious conversion program147 that was intended to bolster the percentage of Bahraini’s 
that were Sunni and loyal to the regime. The release of the al-Bandar Report, dubbed the 
Bandargate Scandal, was further evidence of a methodological process of excluding Shi’a 
from the political apparatus and strengthening the patronage of Sunni elites, and has 
contributed largely to Shi’a held grievances in Bahrain. 
The 2011 Arab Spring protests largely expressed grievances that had historically 
impacted Shi’ites in Bahrain, like the ones mentioned above, but also they articulated 
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cross-sectarian desires for constitutional and governmental reform. The protests were 
orchestrated on February 14 because that day was the tenth anniversary of a referendum 
calling for a Democratic Constitutional Monarchy that, though it had received 98.4 
percent approval by Bahraini voters, was never fully implemented.148 Ten years later, in 
2011, anger at the lack of change led to cross-sectarian calls for: “a parliament with full 
authority; a government that represents the will of the people; fair voting districts; 
discussion of naturalization policy (as a result of the Bandargate Scandal); combating 
corruption; public lands; and addressing sectarian tensions.”149 
While agreements about grievances were initially widespread among the Bahraini 
population, differences in the goals and strategies of protest groups began to divide 
popular and cross-sectarian support for the movement. For example, some of the more 
formal organizations, like Wa’ad, a long-established secular, liberal opposition party with 
both Sunni and Shi’a membership, and Al-Wefaq National Islamic Society, a well-
organized Shi’a political party that held all of the Shi’a won seats in the Lower 
Parliament, called for negotiations and limited reforms.150 Other groups, like the 
“Coalition of February 14th Youth,” and Haaq, a more radical Shi’a group that had 
boycotted the 2010 elections, were more intent on revolution and the dissolution of the 
regime.151 This division among protestors eventually led to many citizens, particularly 
Sunnis who were secular and involved in business, to feel underrepresented and even 
excluded from the protests.152 As the GoB responded with increasing levels of force and 
repression, the protests seemed to take on a more radical and dangerous momentum that 
further excluded moderate Bahrainis. Thus, the grievances that formed the basis of the 
protests in February of 2011 increasingly became more radicalized and prone to sectarian 
instrumentalization and divisions. The next section will describe the ways in which the 
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originally cross-sectarian Arab Spring in Bahrain was transformed into sectarian tensions 
and conflict among the people of Bahrain. 
B. REGIME INSTRUMENTALIZATION THROUGH MEDIA 
MANIPULATION 
As the 2011 uprisings began to unfold, the GoB was faced with a conundrum; 
they could either capitulate to the Arab Spring calls for democratization and reform, 
therefore potentially precipitating the demise of the regime, or they could undermine 
protest grievances by instrumentalizing sectarianism and dividing the cross-sectarian 
support base of the protestors. The GoB realized they did not have to silence all of the 
voices of discontent so long as they could simultaneously isolate the discontented and 
satisfy a core constituency whose continued allegiance would preserve the 
government.153 Because the state understood that Shi’ites were already largely 
dissatisfied with Al-Khalifa rule, “the protestors’ complaints would be in vain so long as 
most Sunnis remain loyal to the regime.”154 This section will detail the ways in which the 
government of Bahrain instrumentalized Sunni and Shi’a cleavages in the 2011 uprisings 
and transformed a largely united Bahraini society into a one fraught with sectarian 
tensions. First, an explanation about Bahrain’s media consumption and the GoB’s 
capacity for media control will be detailed, followed by multiple examples of how this 
control was key in grievance discrediting and sectarian instrumentalization. 
1. The Capacity for Media Influence 
The government of Bahrain has enjoyed a tremendous capacity to instrumentalize 
sectarian divisions during the 2011 uprisings because of Bahrain’s consumption of media 
and the state’s near total control over media. Bahrain enjoys one of the world’s highest 
literacy rates at 99.76% in 2015.155 Furthermore, 99% of all Bahrainis have access to the 
radio, more than 95% access to television, and as of 2010, over 85% had access to 
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broadband Internet.156 Additionally, there is nearly a 2:1 ratio of cellphones to people in 
Bahrain, making it one of the most connected, literate, and capable nations for media 
absorption nearly anywhere in the world.157 A recent study from 2010 asked some 1,187 
students, between the ages of 15–17 (74%) and 18–22 (26%)158 about their media 
consumption. The students reported their daily viewing rates of local news on television 
was either on Bahrain TV (22%), or one of seven other channels controlled by the state’s 
Middle East Broadcasting Center in Bahrain (45%).159 Additionally, a quarter of the 
respondents reported that the Internet was used daily to view news websites—local, 
general, or international, and 37% accessed online political forums every day.160 This is 
consistent with Justin Gengler’s research, which found “that there is something about 
Arab Gulf residents, something independent of their education levels, their economic 
satisfaction, their happiness with their governments’ performance, and so on, that renders 
them more likely to incline toward politics, makes them more likely to undertake political 
actions, and leads to lower levels of political deference.”161 The above data thus indicates 
that news media was actively absorbed by and relevant to a large portion of the Bahraini 
population, something that helped facilitate mobilization during the Arab Spring protests 
but also facilitated the government’s instrumentalization of sectarianism. 
While state owned media is actively consumed by the Bahraini population, the 
Freedom of Press index placed Bahrain at 182
rd
 out of 197 nations in 2012.162 The 
Freedom House statistics are this low because the GoB indirectly or directly controls 
nearly all media sources on their island nation. The GoB indirectly controls all seven of 
the print media sources in Bahrain, only one of which is referred to as an “opposition” 
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newspaper, called al-Wasat.163 While the patronage of the newspaper owners is not 
necessarily proof of GoB manipulation or media propaganda, the al-Bandar Report, 
conveniently is. One clause in the al-Bandar Report explicitly stated that the GoB was to 
“prepare propaganda materials in the form of opinion pieces to be published in the 
newspaper al-Watan, a pro-government publication. Al-Watan [will] ostensibly serve as 
the key vehicle for the anti-Shi’a propaganda created by this secret network.”164 This 
segment from the al-Bandar report does well to address the GoB’s sectarian 
instrumentalization through the media. 
 Sectarian instrumentalization through the media is also achievable because radio 
and television broadcasts are still all officially controlled by the state through the Bahrain 
Radio and Television Corporation and collectively managed by the Bahrain News 
Agency.165 While there are some political spaces on the Internet that are not necessarily 
run by the state explicitly, the Media Affairs Agency (MAA) and Information Affairs 
Authority (IAA) can still monitor, manipulate, and ban sites at a moment’s notice and can 
create firewalls to restrict social media access.166 Additionally, there are no domestic 
private TV broadcasting channels, and any privatized channels that are allowed to be 
shown in the country, including BBC, Al-Jazeera, Al-Arabia, MBC and CNN are all 
prescreened and edited.167 Additionally, it has been reported that even where there is 
space for dissenting opinions, self-censorship is widely practiced because of laws that 
restrict freedom of speech, like the one that makes it illegal to criticize the King or the 
royal family.168 
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The key dissenting argument against the GoB’s ability to control public opinion 
during the Arab Spring is that the GoB’s control of state-run media was not impactful 
enough to counter the pervasive amounts of social media that exposed the true nature of 
the uprisings. While most scholars agree that during the early days and even weeks of the 
Arab Spring in Bahrain, social media was empowering and facilitating, some disagree. 
Studies such as Marc Owen Jones’ “Social Media, Surveillance and Social Control in the 
Bahrain Uprising” and the Institute of Peace’s “New Media and Conflict After the Arab 
Spring,” give concrete examples of the state’s ability to manipulate social media and how 
the nature of new media makes it vulnerable to discreditation. Jones describes how 
“hegemonic forces use social media for the purposes of surveillance, censorship, and 
propaganda” by using or benefiting from “trolling, naming and shaming, offline factors, 
intelligence gathering, and passive observation.”169 Additionally, the Institute of Peace’s 
article, “New Media and Conflict,” adds that it became increasingly hard to separate new 
from old media in the Arab Spring as they facilitated one another, and that overall, new 
media seemed to have more of an amplifying effect, propelling the message abroad, 
rather than having a unifying effect within Bahrain.170 In general, most scholars have 
come to the conclusion that one, “tyrants [also] tweet,”171 and two, while the anonymity 
of the web makes credibility and authenticity very challenging to discern, it also results in 
self-censorship and fear of retribution if surveillance is suspected.172 In fact, many of the 
protest leaders were targeted and accused of crimes based on their posts on social media. 
For example, Nabil Rajab, who had co-founded the Bahrain Center for Human Rights, 
was arrested at Manama airport on May 5, 2012 and sentenced to jail simply over a tweet 
that criticized the Bahraini prime minister.173 
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The GoB also wielded tremendous control over social media not just through 
passive monitoring, but also by deciding which sites to allow and which ones to shut 
down. The Twitter feed Harghum “posted the names and photographs of alleged 
protesters, and sometimes even posted protesters’ addresses, telephone numbers and 
current locations.”174 The GoB opted to allow this Twitter feed to continue, even though 
it resulted in the vandalizing of anti-government protestor’s private residences and forced 
people to abandon their homes in fear. Some have argued that Harghum served a useful 
pro-government function so the GoB focused more of its attention on targeting and 
shutting down anti-government sites.175 As the Bahrain Independent Commission of 
Inquiry (BICI) report discovered, “The GoB used firewalls to block certain social media 
and other websites. However, the GoB has not permanently shut down Twitter feeds such 
as Harghum, even though they produced material that international law requires to be 
prohibited [like names and addresses] and which is in fact prohibited under Bahrain 
law.”176 In general, Bahrain was a caustic social media environment that was not 
conducive to political opposition support. As one Al-Jazeera reporter, Gregg Carlstrom, 
tweeted; “Bahrain has by far the hardest-working Twitter trolls of any country I’ve 
reported on.”177 
The information on news access, consumption, and biases presented thus far 
paints a detailed picture of the GoB’s ability to influence media messaging, the 
tremendously high percentage of media absorption in Bahrain, and lastly, how influential 
this information was on the perspectives of a very politically active population. In 
combination, the GoB had both the means and capacity to influence protester’s 
sentiments and discredit legitimate cross-sectarian grievances during the Arab Spring. 
                                                 
174 Mahmoud Cherif Bassiouni et al., “Report of the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry,” 
(Manama, Bahrain: Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry, 2011), 401. 
175 Ibid., 401–02.  
176 Ibid., 402. 
177 Jones, “Social Media, Surveillance, and Control,” 78. 
 43 
2. Evidence of Sectarian Instrumentalization by the GoB 
Instrumentalizing sectarian tensions by suggesting that Iran influenced the 
protests, the protests were a Shi’a only uprising, and that the protestors were dangerous, 
allowed the GoB to delegitimize the Arab Spring grievances and foment sectarian 
tensions in Bahrain. The regime’s emphasis on Iranian participation in the Arab Spring 
was one of the mostly widely used tactics by the GoB to delegitimize the homegrown 
nature and cross-sectarian support of the protests. One of the primary sources that 
documented the GoB’s incitement of sectarianism has been the Bahrain Independent 
Commission of Inquiry. The BICI was a report royally commissioned in the aftermath of 
the protests to address some of the human rights abuses and issues that arose during the 
protests. While the commissioning of the report was a good step forward, implementing 
the recommendations has largely failed to occur. Nonetheless, the report offered insights 
on methods by the GoB to stir up sectarianism by falsifying Iranian involvement in the 
protests. 
a. Iranian Involvement 
The BICI suggested that some media sources were instrumental in perpetuating 
rhetoric of Iranian involvement. For example, the report highlighted a television program 
titled, “Al Rased” which aired on Bahrain TV, which emphasized sectarianism and 
Iranian involvement. The program showed clips of Bahraini citizens protesting and 
described them as “traitors linked to Iran and a liability to Bahraini society.”178 The 
program then depicted three images of the Middle East as Iran spreads across it until, by 
2017, the black flag of Iran has covered the whole of the Arab Peninsula (see image 
below).179 
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Figure 5.  Iran Taking over the Arabian Peninsula on “Al-Rased”180 
The BICI concluded that “al-Rased,” and other programs like it, influenced 
Bahraini’s opinions that the uprisings in Bahrain were part of a larger Iranian plot. Ali 
Al-Saffar, a Middle East economist in London, presented a similar conclusion as the 
BICI when he asserted that the GoB attempted to portray the uprisings as Iranian backed 
and thus illegitimate; as sectarian and thus undemocratic, and “the vehicle it chose to do 
that with was Bahrain TV (BTV).”181 He continued by saying that “[BTV] got across the 
story the government wanted it to get across, which is to frame the protest movement as 
being solely Shi’a—which we knew it wasn’t—as violent, and to make the Sunna 
minority feel like if the protesters got what they wanted, the Sunni community would be 
threatened.”182 As news sources continued to repeat this same rhetoric, it became harder 
to consider dissenting opinions against the sectarianization of the protest movement. 
Key government officials in the GoB also perpetuated the sectarian discourse of 
an Iranian uprising in their public statements. Saqer al Khalifa, a former media advisor 
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for the Bahraini embassy in Washington, said that the February 2011 uprising in Bahrain 
was the long awaited, Iranian backed, Shi’a revolt.183 Saqer al Khalifa also stated that 
since 1979, when the Islamic revolution occurred in Iran, the Bahraini government had 
been training and preparing for the revolt in Bahrain for years by developing a very 
capable security apparatus.184 The accusations of Iranian involvement also came straight 
from the King himself. King Hamad al Khalifa said quite explicitly when justifying Saudi 
military force in Bahrain that, “the legitimate demands of the opposition were hijacked by 
extremists with ties to foreign governments in the region;” which served as a clear 
reference to Iran and a clear undermining of legitimate grievances.185 Statements by 
government officials were crucial in perpetuating the sectarian tensions in Bahrain. 
Continuously suggesting Iranian involvement served to both systematically 
discredit any opposition group’s grievances and further emphasized the sectarian 
divisions of the country. Despite ample data that indicates that Iranian was not the source 
of the Bahraini Arab Spring protests, the GoB has maintained this firm belief and 
unrelenting insistence. As one author noted in 2012, “It is striking that, more than a year 
after the start of the protests, officials have not provided evidence (such as 
communications, financial links or other intelligence findings) to indicate that Iran was 
the source of anything other than moral support for the Bahraini opposition.”186 Other 
sources, such as a 2013 Brookings Analysis Paper, also reiterated that “to date, there is no 
hard evidence to indicate that Iran has given material support to factions within the 
Bahraini opposition.”187 Even the BICI concluded that “The evidence presented to the 
Commission by the GoB on the involvement by the Islamic Republic of Iran in the 
internal affairs of Bahrain does not establish a discernible link between specific incidents 
that occurred in Bahrain during February and March 2011 and the Islamic Republic of 
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Iran.”188 However, the power of the Bahraini media has left a majority of the Sunni’s in 
Bahrain convinced of Iranian subversion and with a deep mistrust of Shi’a citizens, 
regardless what factual data is presented.189 
Furthermore, there are just issues in asserting that all Bahraini Shi’a hold loyalty 
to Iran because they are co-religionists. In fact, a majority of Bahraini Shi’ites adhere to 
guidance from clerics in Iraq, particularly Ayatollah Sistani, and do not believe in the 
Iranian model of wilayet-e-faqih (rule of the jurists).190 Not to mention, most Bahraini 
Shi’a are Arab, not Persian, and have a very strong ethnic connection to Bahrain, 
claiming to be the indigenous “Bahrana” people who inhabited the island long before the 
Al Khalifa family’s arrival in the eighteenth century.191 Justin Gengler also conducted 
polling research and concluded that just over 63% of the Shi’a he interviewed believed 
that sharia law was “not at all suitable” as a form of governance.192 This statistic helps 
support the idea that an Islamic State (like Iran’s model) was not the goal of most Shi’a 
protestors, but in fact democracy and rights. 
b. Protestors as Violent 
The GoB also attempted to portray the protesters as violent to justify government 
crackdowns and delegitimize the protesters’ demands. In an article titled, “Anti-Al-
Jazeera: Bahrain’s Notorious State-run TV Channel,” the reporter said that the “protesters 
repeatedly told me they watched crews—usually wearing balaclava masks, to avoid 
identification—plant knives and guns at protest sites, then turn on the cameras to film the 
weapons and protesters suggestively side-by-side.”193 While a single example sounds too 
nefarious to substantiate, accounts of this happening have been repeated by multiple other 
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sources.194 Toby Matthiesen, a Middle East scholar who was there during the protests, 
gave a firsthand account of a spokesman for the Ministry of Interior on Bahrain 
Television, “deliver a chilling statement in which he defended the attack on the 
roundabout and showed knives, swords, and other weapons allegedly found there, as well 
as wounded police officers.”195 According to Matthiesen, “The story [told on BTV] 
seemed to totally contradict what [he] had witnessed, and what [he] could gather from 
people [he] spoke to and from videos and pictures uploaded on social media.”196 In 
Matthiesen’s assessment, what he was witnessing “was the beginning of a media war and 
disinformation campaign spearheaded by the regime to promote its version of events.”197 
The BICI’s review of the accusations that the protestors had weapons similarly 
concluded that “The Commission has not seen any evidence to suggest that the 
demonstrators were armed with weapons.”198 Footage showing abandoned weapons at 
the site of the protests was coupled with the sectarianization of the protestors in media 
coverage. These reports may have contributed to repeated incidents of Sunnis attacking 
Shi’ite protestors.199 Additionally, these enhanced sectarian tensions and fears 
contributed to Sunni neighborhoods forming what they dubbed “popular committees,” 
made up of Sunni men who stood 24-hour watches, “to ensure the safety and security of 
their respective neighborhoods [and] to defend their homes against attacks.”200 
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c. Tactics of Physical Repression 
The GoB was also able to instrumentalize sectarianism during the protests by 
using police and security forces to implement repressive tactics and to specifically target 
Sunni oppositional protestors that gave legitimacy to grievances and promoted cross-
sectarian cooperation. While the protests were at first peaceful and “felt like the most 
natural thing to bring your family to,”201 things quickly changed with the regime’s harsh 
response. On the third night of protests, some 10,000 Bahrainis gathered in the Pearl 
Roundabout shouting slogans like “Down, Down Khalifa,” and “No Shi’ites, no Sunnis, 
only Bahrainis.”202 Terrified of the potential cross-sectarian strength of the protest, the 
regime sent riot police to disrupt the protests. Security forces fired tear gas and rubber 
bullets at short range, burned down the makeshift structures that had been constructed in 
the Pearl Roundabout, and caused the death of three and the injury of dozens.203 This 
began a trend of harsh police tactics that would leave some 30–80 Bahrainis killed during 
protests or in custody.204 
The government’s repression of protestors forced the more moderate voices to 
become terrified and stop participating, and it turned Sunni sympathizers and supporters 
away, making the protests represented by Shi’ites in far greater numbers. Additionally, 
the GoB’s aggressive response to the protests served another parallel function for the 
regime—it rid the Shi’a and Sunni communities of prominent opposition leadership and 
human’s rights activists by silencing them. The opposition newspaper, Al-Wasat, was 
ruthlessly targeted after it tried to report on the regime repression. Its printing house was 
vandalized, its presses largely destroyed, its website blocked, and its co-founder and 
board member, Kareem Fakhrawi, thrown into prison where he would die only a few 
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days later.205 The government also began to target key leadership who were capable of 
facilitating the protests. The government sentenced nineteen Bahraini opposition leaders 
to jail, including the leadership of Haqq, al-Wafa, and the shirazis.206 Additionally, Ali 
al-Salman, the general secretary of the prominent Shi’a political party, al-Wefaq’s, was 
shot in the head and wounded by a tear gas canister from close range, and two former al-
Wefaq MPs were stripped of their citizenship.207 
Police brutality and government repression was not only targeted at Shi’a 
protestors, in fact, Sunni anti-government protestors were targeted for reasons some 
suspect to prevent cross-sectarian support of the movement. For example, activists from 
the leftist group Wa’ad, an Arab Nationalist group made up of both Sunni and Shi’a, 
were targeted in particular.208 A famous Sunni, Ibrahim Sharif, who was the secretary 
general of Wa’ad, had been delivering fiery speeches in support of the protest movement 
urging Sunni-Shi’a unity. In response, Sharif was arrested by a group of masked special 
forces and a pro-regime mob was allowed to ransack the Wa’ad headquarters.209 In 
defiance, Ibrahim Sharif detailed the torture he experienced while in custody through 
letters smuggled out of prison and had them posted online, but paid the price with a five 
year jail sentencing conducted by a special security court.210 Sharif, being a prominent 
Sunni anti-government protestor, was a serious challenge for the GoB’s message of a 
Shi’a/Iranian dominated uprising, thus Wa’ad and its leaders suffered the consequences 
of harsh repression. 
The GoB went to great lengths to discredit and instrumentalize the 2011 protests 
because doing so silenced the challenges to the regime’s power and authority. Even the 
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man who was commissioned by King Hamad to produce the BICI, legal scholar Professor 
Cherif Bassiouni told the king after he concluded his findings from the BICI, “You have 
a choice between the unity of the country and the unity of the family.”211 The Al-Khalifa 
family was “determined not to go the way of Egypt and Tunisia,” and allow the passage 
of reforms to destroy the government and stability of Bahrain.212 The survival of the 
regime and the long term stability of Bahrain were therefore more critical in the eyes of 
the GoB than preventing social turmoil and sectarian tensions. 
C. REGIONAL CONTEXTUALIZATION 
The proxy war hypothesis, which argues that Bahrain’s Shi’ites are a proxy for 
Iran and was the raison d’etre for the Arab Spring uprising, has largely been discredited 
and considered inaccurate. While influence and moral support did indeed exist from Iran, 
the Bahraini people were acting on their own accord in a local context, not as proxy 
agents of the bigger regional challenges. Therefore, the focus of this section is on how the 
regional contextualization of the rivalry between Saudi and Iran and the circumstances of 
instability throughout the Middle East, particularly Iraq and Syria, has impacted the 
reactions to and perceptions of the Arab Spring in Bahrain. Furthermore, and most 
importantly, the context of the regional environment has set the stage for the saliency of 
sectarian identity and allowed this to be a key mobilizing and instrumentalizing factor 
during Bahrain’s Arab Spring. Thus, this section will attempt to shed some light on how 
this greater rivalry and regional turmoil heightened sectarianism within Bahrain and 
facilitated the sectarian narrative built by the GoB. A general overview of the regional 
context and how this impacted the GoB will be explored, followed by brief discussions of 
both Iran and Saudi Arabia’s involvement in Bahrain and how this impacted sectarian 
identities. 
The case of Bahrain and the instrumentalization of sectarianism by the GoB is an 
incomplete assessment without considering the impact of regional events and the 
Saudi/Iranian rivalry. As one scholar noted, “Bahrain’s political fault lines have never 
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simply matched sectarian lines, but in a context of heightened regional sectarian tensions, 
Sunni and Shi’a communities have become increasingly polarized.”213 Thus, the context 
of regional events impacted the GoB’s fears of their Shi’ite population, shaped many of 
their discriminatory measures, and heightened the saliency of Bahraini sectarian 
identities. 
What has made the 2011 Arab Spring time period unique from previous periods 
of mobilization and identity politics in Bahrain is largely due to Bahrain’s unique 
geostrategic position and the contemporary regional turmoil. Bahrain is a very small 
island located just off the east coast of Saudi Arabia and across the North Arabian Gulf 
from Iran. Religious, ethnic, and tribal ties connect segments of Bahrain’s population to 
Iraq, Iran, and Saudi Arabia, and have exposed the island nation to politicization of 
identity from all three of these powerful nations.214 Additionally, though being the first 
nation to discover oil, Bahrain was promptly the first to also run out, leaving it dependent 
on assistance from other nations and not organically a stable oil economy.215 These 
factors have made Bahrain susceptible to the winds of politicization that have shifted 
throughout the Middle East, and its geographically strategic position and diminutive size 
have also made it highly desirable as a sphere of influence. With these vulnerabilities in 
mind, Bahrain has been acutely aware of its need for allies. Bahrain’s leadership, largely 
due to the ethnic, tribal, and religious connections of the Al-Khalifa family to the Arab 
Peninsula, has forged a marriage with Saudi Arabia and the Gulf Cooperation Council 
(GCC) nations instead of a relationship with Iran. In the 1970s, the UN conducted 
surveys and interviews among Bahraini people, which found that a majority of Bahrainis 
desired independence.216 As a result of this polling, the Shah of Iran formally 
relinquished Iran’s territorial claims to Bahrain in 1971.217 Additionally, the assistance 
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by the United States in protecting the Gulf countries during the Iraq/Iran war during the 
1980s also increased the bonds of the GCC nations and the U.S. with Bahrain.218 
The impact of current events, particularly the 2003 War in Iraq, has drastically 
shaped the perspectives and fears of Sunni-led nations in the Middle East. The power 
vacuum that resulted from state collapse in Iraq facilitated the rise of the Shi’ite majority 
into positions of authority, and resulted in the repression of the Sunni minority and an 
increased influence from Iran. The events in Iraq have increased fears of Shi’ite 
uprisings, Iranian influence and expansion,219 and has made Sunni governments with 
Shi’ite populations particularly leery about jeopardizing the stability of their regime. One 
of the most telling examples of how fears of Iran and Shi’ites have been enhanced by the 
collapse of Iraq is from an al-Bandar report study titled, “A Proposal to Promote the 
General Situation of the Sunni Sect in Bahrain,” written in 2005 by an Iraqi academic 
under commission from the Bahraini government. The author of the report cited the 
reason for heightened sectarian tensions in Bahrain were due to “the historic changes that 
threaten the Arab Gulf region [as a consequence of] the fall of the former Iraqi 
regime.”220 The study elaborated that 
the marginalization of Sunnis and the lessening of their role in Bahrain is 
part of a larger regional problem...there is a dangerous challenge facing 
Bahraini society in the increased role of the Shi’a [and] the retreat of the 
role of the Sunna in the Bahraini political system; namely, the problem 
concerns the country’s [Bahrain’s] national security, and the likelihood of 
political regime change in the long term by means of the present 
relationships between Bahrain’s Shi’a and all the Shi’a in Iran, Iraq, Saudi 
Arabia’s eastern region, and Kuwait.221 
This report and similar sentiments in the GoB further entrenched fears of Shi’ite 
citizenry that had first been cultivated in the wake of the Iranian revolution and the 1981 
Shi’a coup. Thus, for the GoB, the exclusion of Shi’ites from the security services, the 
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use of foreign Sunni mercenaries, the purposeful gerrymandering to increase Sunni 
voting capacity, and even the Sunni naturalization process, were all in response to this 
fear of Shi’ites and Iran due to the regional events that heightened sectarian tensions. 
Iran and Saudi Arabia have also been very impactful in heighten sectarian 
tensions directly in Bahrain as a part of their own competition and tension with one 
another. While it is true that Iran is not “the driving force behind the unrest in Bahrain,” 
Iran is certainly a complicating factor.222 Iranian officials, clerics, and media outlets were 
very vocal in their support of the Shi’a population in Bahrain during the protests.223 For 
Iran, supporting Shi’a causes across the Middle East is popular with the Iranian people 
and has been seen as an effective way to compete with Saudi Arabia for regional 
influence. As one analyst described, “Iran can benefit simply by emphasizing—in a 
partisan and often exaggerated way—abuses in Bahrain as an indication of the failings of 
the Gulf monarchies that it is so keen to discredit.”224 For example, in January, 2012, 
Ayatollah Khamenei expressed his support of the protests during an “Islamic Awakening 
and Youth Conference,” when he said to the audience, “What you did in Egypt, what you 
did in Tunisia, what you did in Libya, what you are doing in Yemen, what you are doing 
in Bahrain … is part of a battle against this dangerous and harmful dictatorship that has 
been pressuring humanity for two centuries.”225 This statement suggests that Iran 
supported the protests in Bahrain possibly even more so because of their opposition to 
Western-backed Sunni regimes than because of any co-religionists sentiments.226 
Comparatively, Iran has been much quieter about brutalities committed against Shi’a in 
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Pakistan than they were in Bahrain.227 While the rich history of Bahrain and Iran adds 
deeper dimensions to their support of the protests, the important take away is that Iran has 
benefited from supporting the protests in Bahrain because it serves to undermine Saudi 
Arabia and other gulf monarchies, with whom Iran considers itself in competition with. 
This instrumentalization of Shi’a identity by Iran has contributed greatly to the saliency 
of sectarian identity and suspicions on the part of the GoB simply because of sectarian 
identity. 
Saudi Arabia has also been paramount in heightening sectarian identity through 
their involvement in the Bahraini Arab Spring and their support of the GoB. Saudi 
officials see Bahrain as a bulwark against the threat of Iranian expansion into the Arabian 
Gulf and as a necessary ally in dealing with their own minority Shi’a population.228 In 
fact, part of Saudi’s decision to bolster hardliners within the al-Khalifa regime of Bahrain 
is because they mirror Saudi’s own response to their Shi’a population in the Eastern 
Province of Saudi Arabia.229 The Saudis viewed the Bahraini Shi’a-dominated uprising 
as “a direct threat to their own domestic security; a victory for the Shi’a of Bahrain would 
certainly inspire Saudi Arabia’s own disaffected Shi’a population in the eastern 
provinces.”230 In fact, this is exactly what happened as Bahrain’s Arab Spring sparked a 
sort of Arab Spring within Saudi Arabia’s Shi’a population, just across the Causeway 
Bridge that unites the two countries. Thus, the protests in Bahrain created a personal 
interest for Saudi Arabia in cementing the status quo in Bahrain and stabilizing the 
country. The direct involvement by Saudi Arabia and the co-religionist Shi’a protests 
between the two countries is part of the regional context that has further entrenched the 
saliency of sectarian identity. Though both Bahrain’s and Saudi Arabia’s protests did 
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have true grievances and desires for reform, the identity which was most accentuated by 
these mutual protests, and by the GoB and Saudi regimes, was sectarian. 
Bahrain also greatly depends on Saudi Arabia for its own livelihood, a decisive 
factor that has enhanced Saudi Arabia’s influence in Bahrain and impacted Bahrain’s 
sectarian instrumentalization.231 Bahrain’s decision to allow Saudi troops to march across 
the Causeway into Bahrain and participate in riot control measures was a clear signal 
both from Bahrain’s government and from Saudi Arabia that they stood together in the 
regional contestation against Iran. Bahrain’s Arab Spring, therefore, in a way became a 
proxy for Saudi Arabia’s own contestation against Iran and Iranian influence, and it was 
this direct influence from Saudi Arabia that further activated sectarian identity as a part of 
the protest movement. This point comes out clearly when considering King Hamad’s 
statements about why he requested Saudi and UAE troops to come to his aid. King 
Hamad stated that his government was forced to use foreign military intervention to 
impose order because “the legitimate demands of the opposition were hijacked by 
extremists with ties to foreign governments in the region,” a clear and direct reference to 
Iran.232 Thus, the regional rivalry and competition between Iran and Saudi provided the 
contextualization that heightened sectarian identity and was crucial in shaping Bahrain’s 
response to the protests. Thus, the GoB’s decision to use the fear of Iranian infiltration as 
a primary reason for delegitimizing the protestors enhanced the saliency of sectarian 
identity and contributed to sectarian conflict in Bahrain. 
D. CONCLUSION 
The Arab Spring in Bahrain led the GoB to recognize the potential implications to 
regime survival if a united Shi’a and Sunni uprising was allowed to persist. Thus, the 
GoB employed various tactics to amplify sectarian divides within the country and reduce 
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the cross-sectarian nature of the protests. Sectarian identity was a salient identity for 
Bahrainis because of the history of grievances that fell along sectarian lines due to the 
GoB’s “divide and rule” tactics (like the exclusion of Shi’a from the public sector, 
gerrymandering, etc.), and because of the regional Sunni/Shi’a rivalry between Saudi 
Arabia and Iran that further activated sectarian identities. These factors of grievances and 
regional contextualization contributed to the GoB’s decision to instrumentalize sectarian 
identities during the Arab Spring in order to delegitimize the protestors and divide the 
cross-sectarian calls for regime reform. The GoB successfully instrumentalized 
sectarianism by allowing or facilitating biased reporting on the protests; allowing harsh 
repression and policing tactics, including ones that silenced Sunni opposition figures; and 
by continually pushing a narrative of the protests as being orchestrated and supported by 
Iran. However, unlike other areas of the Middle East, like Yemen, even at the height of 
unrest and chaos during Bahrain’s uprisings, these sectarian tensions never resulted in 
sectarian violence.233 This case study has therefore demonstrated that the IVs of 
grievances, instrumentalization, and regional context are directly and crucially linked to 
the rise and fomentation of sectarian identity and tension within Bahrain. However, short 
of the final IV of state collapse, these tensions have failed to be activated into identity-
based violence. 
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III. YEMEN CASE STUDY 
This chapter on Yemen will focus on exploring the first three IVs, grievances, 
instrumentalism, and the proxy war, and how these have specifically affected sectarian 
sentiment and tensions in the country of Yemen. Yemen, in many ways, exemplifies how 
identities are heightened, encouraged, mobilized, and disseminated over time. Though 
this thesis is constructivist in thinking about identity mobilization and identity groups, it 
does not suggest that this can occur rapidly. A big part of Yemen’s current sectarianism is 
a direct result of the grievances of certain identity groups, the individual actors 
emphasizing sectarian identities, and the regional context, all which have been building 
for decades and have contributed to making sectarian identity salient in Yemen. Thus, 
this thesis chapter will focus on how the sectarian narrative was built in Yemen and 
became an activated identity. To show this, the three IVs will be explored in Yemen. 
First, the chapter will detail a brief explanation of Yemen’s sectarian history and the 
legitimate grievances of key minorities in order to shed light on how identity 
entrepreneurs have been able to give context to the sectarian narrative. Second, the 
saliency of the sectarian narrative will be explained through the influence of the regional 
contest for power between Sunni Saudi Arabia and Shi’ite Iran. Third, how the 
government of Yemen (GoY) has deliberately crafted a sectarian narrative will be 
revealed. The following analytical chapter will then demonstrate how this identity 
resulted in increased levels of violence as the state began to weaken and eventually 
collapse. 
A. ZAYDI GRIEVANCES 
Yemen’s history of the Zaydi Shi’a imamate, Zaydi grievances against the GoY, 
and the Zaydi’s competition for religious and political legitimization are important 
elements in understanding sectarianism in Yemen. However, while “Grievances alone 
cannot explain the outbreak of violence,” they do “play an important role in the 
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mobilization process.”234 The grievances felt by the Zaydis, from the cultural attacks on 
their community to their lack of political and economic inclusion, have contributed to 
their reasons for mobilization and have been actively challenged by the GoY. The 
government perceived Zaydi activism as a potential threat and this was impactful in the 
GoY’s opposition to the Zaydi movement. Understanding the Zaydi grievances and the 
government’s response to them can shed light on how the Houthis and the GoY have 
been able to instrumentalize sectarianism and effectively build the sectarian narrative in 
Yemen. 
The history of sectarianism in Yemen has its own unique and localized flavor and 
understanding its nuances thus becomes important to prevent the sweeping sectarian 
generalizations often levied at the Middle East. Until 1962, the Zaydis had a centuries-old 
imamate235 and have dominated the northwest highlands of the South Arabian Peninsula 
since the ninth century.236 Since the twelfth century, Muslims in Yemen have followed 
the Shafa’i school of Islamic law, shaping the Sunni and Zaydi-Shi’a in the region much 
differently from their Sunni and Shi’a counterparts in other regions of the Middle East.237 
Thus, the Zaydi-Shi’ite’s religious practices and adherences are closer to their fellow 
Yemeni Sunnis of the Shafa’i order than those of the dominant Twelver Shi’a sect found 
in Iran, Iraq, and other Middle Eastern nations.238 Also in contrast to other Shi’ites in the 
region is the claim that the Zaydi imamates and many other Zaydi families are 
Hashemites (sayyid), that is, direct descendants from the Prophet Muhammad.239 Thus, 
this widely respected religious and tribal authority has a deep history and still remains 
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critical to the Zaydi and northern Yemeni identity. As this paper will show, this history of 
a revered social status and a nearly thousand-year-old Shi’a imamate has been used by 
both the Zaydis themselves and Sunni oppositionists to encourage identity narratives. The 
Zaydis, particularly the Houthi movement, has fomented these historical narratives to 
rejuvenate culture, prestige, and the saliency of the Zaydi identity. Both Sunni elites and 
the GoY have also used the Zaydi’s history and identity to build a sectarian narrative and 
activate sectarian fears against the Zaydis. 
The grievance variable is critical in the manifestation of sectarianism in Yemen. 
Grievances stem largely from social and economic reasons, the first relating to the 
activation of sectarian identity due to the Shi’a-Zaydi revivalism, which began in the 
mid-1980s to counter the rise of Sunni-Salafism,240 and second due to the impact of 
relative economic isolation and depravation experienced in the North. The Sunni 
Salafists, which encouraged Zaydi sectarian oppositional mobilization, entered Yemen in 
three main ways: by returning Sunni mujahidin who fought in Afghanistan during the 
1980s; by deliberately funded efforts by the Saudi government throughout the 1980s until 
today; and by men returning from work in Saudi Arabia with Wahhabist ideologies.241  
To expand on these three influences on Zaydis’ social grievances further; firstly, 
returning jihadists from Afghanistan in the 1980s brought Osama Bin Laden’s Sunni 
extremism to Yemen and Saudi Arabia, which would eventually form the basis for Al 
Qaeda in the Arab Peninsula (AQAP).242 Initially, while these jihadists largely focused 
on fighting communists in Southern Yemen, some of them would later become influential 
in fighting the Zaydis during the Sa’ada Wars and AQAP would contribute greatly to 
promoting sectarian violence.243 
Secondly, in the late 1980s into the early 2000s, Wahhabi sheikhs were sent from 
Saudi Arabia to establish mosques, madrassas, and youth centers in northern cities, the 
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center of Zaydi culture.244 One such imam, Moqbil Hadi al-Wadei, was a “strong critic of 
all shades of Shi’i doctrine…in his sermons, books, and cassettes, he often accused the 
Shi’is of being heretics who propagated non-Islamic superstitious beliefs and 
practices.”245 Al-Wadei popularized the Salafist beliefs that became associated with Islah 
Party, the Yemeni political version of the Muslim Brotherhood and a very powerful 
political party. Islah’s “wide tent” of Sunni supporters has allowed it to support “a more-
extreme Salafi contingent that is open to the politicization and deployment by the GoY as 
the [GoY sought] to counter the [Houthi] rebellion.”246 Because Islah has been described 
as a “patronage machine and shelter to Salafis,”247 this has only reinforced Zaydi 
sectarian rhetoric and suspicion against the GoY and Sunnis at large. Furthermore, Islah 
was originally headed by Shaikh Abdullah al-Ahmar of the powerful Ahmar family in the 
northern Hashid tribal confederation,248 adding elements of tribal competition and 
patronage into an already tense battle for religious legitimacy. 
Thirdly, returning remittance workers from Saudi Arabia brought a large increase 
in Salafi and Wahhabi ideologies, which threatened Zaydi Shi’a identity, religion, and 
culture.249 The often low-class, working men who returned to Yemen from Saudi Arabia 
were drawn to Yemen’s burgeoning Salafi mosques and the Islah party because the 
egalitarian nature of Salafism challenged the Zaydi sayyid religious and tribal elite 
status.250 These men became the basis of Sunni support for the Wahabbi clerics like al-
Wadei. Furthermore, the GoY and Saudi Arabia would later take advantage of the large 
numbers of Salafists in Zaydi territory to exasperate religious tensions and justify military 
action against the Zaydis. 
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Economic grievances in the North have come from the north’s perception of 
relative economic deprivation and isolation. Yemen’s economy, particularly in the north, 
heavily relied on Yemeni men preforming temporary migrant work in Saudi Arabia and 
sending their remittances back to their families.251 However, in 1991, just as Islah and al-
Wadei were gaining prominence, Saudi Arabia, angry over President Ali Abdullah 
Saleh’s refusal to condemn Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait, refused to allow 
Yemeni workers to stay.252 With a one-month notice, over 800,000 Yemenis were sent 
back across the border to Yemen, resulting in roughly 1.5 billion dollars in lost 
remittance salaries and increasing unemployment to over 25%.253 The flow of low-status, 
unemployed, shabab (young men) back across the border impacted the Northern Yemeni 
economy most severely. Furthermore, while the remittance money had helped enhance 
the northern economy, it was still almost entirely self-sufficient from the central 
government and the nature of the landscape and harshness of the farming conditions had 
prevented agricultural specialization and limited trade options.254 This promoted very 
tight and distinctly independent bonds between the communities in Northern Yemen, 
where goods were traded on a critical system of roads and paths that united towns and 
villages to provide sustainment.255 However, the “vulnerability of this economic system 
is tremendous and impacted greatly by warfare,”256 exasperating the Zaydi’s economic 
grievances against the GoY. 
The grievances against increasing spread of Salafist beliefs and economic 
isolation led the Zaydi’s to organize the Shabab al-Moumineen or the “Believing 
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Youth,”257 which was founded in the early 1990s by both prominent Zaydi Shi’a clerics 
and ambitious, young, non-sayyid Zaydi youth.258 The Shabab al-Moumineen (Believing 
Youth) founded over twenty-four summer schools, sports camps, and youth groups with 
as many as 15,000 to 18,000 students by the end of 2000.259 The group also held public 
sermons, promoted the educational centers, and distributed literature—all in an attempt to 
reacquaint Zaydi youth to their religious and cultural origins.260 
The buildup of both Zaydi and Salafi movements in North Yemen activated 
sectarian identities and first brought sectarian tension to a dramatic head during the 1991 
and 1992 Zaydi celebrations of ‘Id al-Ghadir, which is a Shi’a celebration of the 
Prophet’s designation of his son-in-law, Ali, as his successor.261 In 1991, Salafists 
attempted to take over the primary mosque of the Believing Youth in the city of Razih by 
importing preachers from Saudi Arabia and installing their own religious officials at the 
mosque.262 Whole Shi’a and Sunni communities were rallied as competition for the 
ability to deliver Friday sermons eventually escalated into armed standoffs at the mosque 
and ended in the murder of the leading Wahhabi cleric’s son.263 These sectarian 
grievances would serve as the basis for the expanding Zaydi sectarian identity and 
resistance to the government’s tacit approval of Salafist infiltration, helping ignite the 
larger conflict of the Sa’ada Wars. 
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B. NARRATIVE BUILDING: INSTRUMENTALIZING SECTARIANISM 
This section will demonstrate the impacts of instrumentalization by elites in 
perpetuating sectarian tensions in Yemen from the Sa’ada Wars through the current civil 
war. While these actions certainly contributed to deaths in the Sa’ada Wars, the greater 
impact of this instrumentalization was to create a sectarian narrative and language, which 
became pervasive and ingrained in Yemeni society. To demonstrate this, three main areas 
will be explored: media messaging and its impact, instrumentalization by the GoY, 
primarily during the Sa’ada Wars, and instrumentalization by the Houthis, from the 
conception of the group through their current civil war. 
1. Sectarianism through Media Messaging 
In order to make the argument that the GoY, the Houthis, and other identity 
entrepreneurs instrumentalized sectarianism, it is necessary to show the level of public 
reachability and societal acceptance of the sectarian narrative. Unlike Bahrain, where 
literacy rates exceed 99% and access to television and radio media access exceeds 
95%,264 roughly only 50–65% of Yemen’s adult population is literate.265 Because of this 
lack of literacy, and with over two thirds of the population living in rural conditions, 
“The print media does not seem to have a strong impact across much of Yemeni 
society.”266 Most of society depends on radio or Internet media to conceptualize current 
events. The ability of both the GoY and the Houthis to exploit media messaging would be 
crucial in the propagation of sectarian narratives and building group solidarity. Arguably, 
however, the GoY long held a clear advantage over the Houthis in media messaging, and 
even when the Houthis took over Saana in 2014, they still only controlled a portion of the 
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nation’s media. Thus, in general, the GoY was more successful at instrumentalizing 
sectarianism through the media than the Houthis were. 
The GoY has focused their anti-Houthi media campaign in all major forms of 
media; print, radio, TV, and Internet. One of the GoY’s message control strengths was in 
their ability to impact the literate segments of society, like the Army, by routinely 
repeating the same themes and messages in print and broadcast publications.267 The GoY 
has published targeted messaging in the “the Army’s newspaper (26 September), the 
General People’s Congress’ political party (GPC’s), newspaper (al-Mu’tammar), and 
English news sources affiliated with the GoY (like Saba’ News).”268 
In addition to targeting literate members of society through print media, the 
government extensively reached out into other forms of media such as television 
(primarily local stations but some satellite), radio (the most prolific), and the Internet 
(however, only 22.6% of the population uses the Internet, the lowest in the Middle 
East).269 The GoY was able to greatly influence the media that was the most widely 
consumed—television and radio—because of the monopoly they maintain over most of 
the broadcasting stations.270 There were still a few private and satellite distributors, like 
Al-Masirah, which was pro-Houthi and operated from Beirut, and Suhayl TV, which was 
religious-based and operated via satellite from the UK; however, their audience was 
limited.271 Additionally, these limited opposition channels could not compete with the 
fact that “the GoY leadership, including President Saleh himself, [gave] televised 
interviews on the [Sa’ada] conflict and [took] advantage of ‘impromptu’ appearances 
before journalists’ cameras to talk about the GoY’s progress in the conflict.”272 
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Furthermore, because television was limited in Yemen, the interviews were also 
transcribed and printed into GoY-affiliated papers and English-language outlets, which 
served to reinforce regime messaging and increased the distribution of that messaging.273 
The GoY also attempted to control journalism and messaging in the northern parts 
of Yemen and internationally as well. The GoY frequently used the government radio 
stations in Sa’ada to broadcast anti-Houthi messages; for example, propaganda interviews 
with individuals associated by blood or tribe to the Houthi family who condemned the 
actions of the Houthis.274 The other advantage the government maintained during this 
time was the state imposed “media blackout” that made further detailed analysis of media 
messaging or even factual accounts of what happened during the Sa’ada Wars very 
difficult to obtain. During this time, both domestic and international media reporting on 
the conflict was restricted to prevent Houthi ideals from gaining notoriety or government 
military action from gaining attention.275 The Freedom House stated that “Yemen’s 
government severely restricted press freedom; security forces intimidated, beat, and 
arrested dozens of journalists who had expressed criticism of the government.”276 
Additionally, the government continuously enacted Article 103 of the Press and 
Publications Law which outlaws “direct personal criticism of the head of state” and 
publication of material that “might spread a spirit of dissent and division among the 
people” or “lead to the spread of ideas contrary to the principles of the Yemeni 
Revolution.”277 This law was used as justification to ban, destroy, and outlaw Zaydi or 
opposition media. According to human rights groups, “the Ministry of Culture and the 
Political Security Organizations (PSOs) monitored and sometimes removed from stores 
printed materials that espoused Zaydi-Shi’a doctrine.”278 Additionally, human rights 
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groups have reported that the government banned the publishing of Zaydi-Shi’a Islamic 
materials and even “distributed grade-school textbooks that described the Zaydi manner 
of prayer as incorrect.”279 Additionally, the regime has targeted youth messaging in 
schools by mandating curriculum consistent with regime messaging, and by closing down 
summer camps associated with the Believing Youth and the Houthis while opening its 
own GoY sponsored summer camps in and around Zaydi areas.280 These actions 
increased Yemenis’ repeated exposure to the regime’s sectarian messaging with limited 
access to a counter-narrative. 
The importance of media in Yemen was so critical that controlling this messaging 
was one of the first goals of the Houthis upon their takeover of Sana’a in late 2014. 
Though the collapse of the Saleh regime in 2011 temporarily increased media capacity 
and freedoms in Yemen as hundreds of new private websites, sixteen new broadcasting 
channels, and thirteen new radio stations were created,281 the takeover of Yemen’s 
temporary government by the Houthis in late 2014/early 2015 has seen a drastic decrease 
in press freedom and an increase in media messaging favoring the Houthis.282 According 
to assessments of press capacity and freedoms, the Houthis succeeded “in controlling 
most of the media outlets in Sana’a and a number of other invaded Yemeni cities by 
attacking their headquarters and their regional branches.”283 Additionally, the Houthis 
were successful in taking control of the main telecommunications provider for Yemen 
and through this, blocking pro-regime, anti-Houthi messaging on multiple websites.284 
The Houthis also made serious efforts to distribute their messaging. They have set up 
large television screens and speakers in stadiums to showcase their leadership, 
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particularly Abdul-Malik al-Houthi, speaking about the Houthis and trying to gain 
support and sympathizers (see image below).285 
 
Figure 6.  Abdul-Malik al-Houthi Speech Project at a Houthi Rally 
Much of the Houthi propaganda has a “religious character and focuses on issues 
including the overarching US-Israeli conspiracy and Arab ‘collusion.’”286 Their 
broadcasts also play traditional songs from the Northern mountainous regions of Yemen, 
encouraging courage and faith for their fighters and promoting Zaydi culture.287 
Furthermore, with the near monopoly of print, TV, and radio broadcast in areas 
controlled by the Houthis, they have been able to distribute sermons and religious 
messaging promoting Zaydi Shiism with ease.288 Thus, control of the media has been as 
critical for the Houthi movement promoting itself as it was for the GoY in discrediting 
the Houthis. Instrumentalists require a platform, and for both parties, the media has 
played a major role in the distribution and propagation of sectarian narratives. 
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Unfortunately, as conflict has intensified since 2015, media has become more 
restricted and less supporting of unbiased opinions. A Center for Media and Economic 
Studies published in August of 2015 indicated that over 350 press workers in Yemen 
were jobless due to closures, seizing of newspapers, and the termination of certain visual 
and audio broadcasts.289 Additionally, the impact of civil war and Operation Decisive 
Storm has put many journalists at risk of being kidnapped, abused, and indiscriminately 
killed.290 This has caused journalists to move south to areas uncontrolled by the Houthis, 
like Aden, and also resulted in Arab channels taking over the broadcasting of key stations 
like Al Arabiya and Aden Live from abroad.291 Overall, media messaging has been 
critical for both pro and anti-Houthi forces as they compete for messaging and has 
impacted sectarian propaganda throughout the country. 
2. Instrumentalization of Sectarianism by Other Means 
a. The GoY’s Instrumentalization 
The Saleh regime did its best to instrumentalize sectarianism in their fight against 
the Houthi movement by implementing a deliberate policy of delegitimizing the Houthis’ 
grievances, particularly during the Sa’ada Wars. The GoY attempted to portray the 
Houthis as being an Iranian proxy, “closeted imamis,” cowardly, oppressive, and against 
Republican ideals through targeted propaganda, religious accusations, and military 
intervention.292 This section will detail the saliency and methods of GoY sectarian 
instrumentalization. 
The government of Yemen’s actions to instrumentalize sectarianism in opposition 
to the Houthis was not limited to media messaging. The GoY also constructed the 
sectarian narrative by purposely instigating religious tensions by targeting Zaydi religious 
institutions and by transforming the focus of the Sa’ada Wars into a religious battle. 
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These actions, as the government hoped, further fueled the radicalization of the Houthis 
and increasingly isolated their group from the tribal and familial ties they had previously 
maintained peacefully with Sunnis in the region. Through the actions of the Government, 
the sectarian narrative of the Zaydis was truly cemented in Yemeni society. 
The government incited Zaydi communal anger by restricting their freedom to 
practice their religion. The GoY shifted approved prayer times in some of the country’s 
main mosques from times traditionally observed by the Zaydis to times observed by 
Salafist.293 Additionally, the government closed Zaydi mosques in the North and in 
Sana’a, claiming them to be “extremists Shi’a religious institutes;” banned or reassigned 
Imams found to be sympathetic to “radical” Zaydi doctrine and replaced them with Sunni 
or Salafist imams; and monitored Zaydi mosque services.294 The GoY then summoned 
“GoY-affiliated Shafi’i and Salafi ‘ulama’ to publish fatwas (legal rulings) condemning 
the Houthis in terms aligned with GoY rhetoric.”295 For the Zaydis, the situation was 
further escalated into sectarianism when, according to Human Rights groups, hundreds of 
Zaydis were jailed simply because of their religious association, despite a lack of 
evidence that they had supported Houthi military actions.296 These governmental actions 
drove Zaydi leaders to believe that there was a concerted effort on the part of Saleh’s 
regime to abolish Zaydi culture and to “insert Salafi traditions, mosques, and imams into 
traditionally Zaydi regions.”297 The government targeted these Zaydi religious 
institutions because the narrative they had constructed to combat the Houthis was one 
that encompassed all Shi’a-Zaydis, even if in reality not all Shi’a-Zaydis supported or 
agreed with the Houthi movement. Therefore, the government’s continued actions to 
target Zaydis as a whole group demonstrated their commitment to building the sectarian 
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narrative in order to diminish the real grievances of their citizens and garner support from 
Sunnis both inside and out of Yemen. 
The Saleh regime also recognized that by instrumentalizing sectarianism during 
the Sa’ada Wars, they could recruit Sunnis and Salafists to fight with government forces 
or tribal militias against the Houthis, as well as appease the powerful Salafist elements 
within the GoY itself.298 This deliberate conscription of Salafists only served to further 
propel the sectarian narrative as it confirmed Houthi and Zaydi fears of a government 
partnership with Salafists to target Zaydis. Additionally, the sectarian rhetoric Saleh’s 
regime used to entice Sunni fighters into conscription added a religious element to the 
wars that had previously not existed. Below is a piece of GoY propaganda posted for 
army troops during the Sa’ada campaigns: 
 
     
Figure 7.  GoY Tactical Information Operations Leaflet Condemning Houthis in 
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             [Translation] 
 
The Illustrious Religious Scholars of Yemen: 
 
Shaykh al-Raymi: All together must stand against 
those who are working very hard to establish an 
apostate [Shi‘ite; rafidi] order. 
 
Shaykh Mahfuz: We must continue the efforts 
and close ranks to confront this discord and bury 
it. 
 
Shaykh al-Mu‘allim: There is no use to 
endeavoring with the rebels except for decisively 
finishing [them] and using force. 
 
Shaykh al-Mahdi: These [Huthis] directed their 
weapon toward the umma; fighting them is 
legitimate and this is a religious ruling [hukm 
shar‘i.] 
 
Shaykh Hasan: Those who revolt against the 
consensus of the umma and the [existing political] 




In March of 2007, the Yemeni Ministry of Defense officially published a fatwa 
(religious edict) authorizing and obligating “the use of deadly force against the 
[Believing] Youth.”300 Military chaplains then further “echoed GoY pronouncements to 
Sunni troops,” providing them with “Islamic justification for prosecuting a war against 
fellow Yemenis.”301 The government’s release of a religious directive is an incredibly 
important example of the GoY’s incitement of sectarianism. The GoY, though running an 
Islamic nation, technically still affords religious protection in its own Constitution to non-
Muslims or minority Muslim groups like the Zaydis.302 By using the pulpit of the 
Ministry of Defense and its own military chaplains, the GoY was able to instrumentalize 
religion into the Sa’ada conflict by encouraging Sunnis to fight against the Zaydis on 
religious grounds. Additionally, Saleh’s main general in charge of the First Armored 
Division, who conducted the GoY’s campaign against the Houthis, Ali Mohsen al-
Ahmar, was a “Zaydi turned Salafist.”303 Additionally, Ali Mohsen was not just a 
prominent figure and member of Islah (the Sunni/Salafist political party),304 but he was 
also known to be “openly pro-Salafi with links to jihadists”305 and “recruited extreme 
Salafist directly into the fight, regardless of geographic or tribal background.”306 General 
Mohsen was a significant part of the regime’s sectarian narrative because his use as the 
leading general demonstrated the GoY’s catering to internal Salafist sentiments and 
encouragement of a religious facet of the Sa’ada Wars. 
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The GoY additionally mobilized irregular militias led by Sunni tribal sheikhs who 
also held leadership rank in the Yemeni military and who had “either passively supported 
or actively promoted the spread of radical Sunni Islam in Sa’ada since the 1990s.”307 
However, instead of employing these “Colonel Sheiks” as a part of the normal GoY army 
infantry to fight the Houthis, Saleh sent these men to lead their own, independent, 
irregular militias against the Houthis.308 These sheikh-led militias were made up not just 
of loyal tribesmen, but also of Salafists eager to fight the Houthis. Among the ranks of 
the irregular militias there have been reports of “members of the Abyan Aden Islamic 
Army (a known terrorist organization with connections to Al-Qaeda in Southern Yemen) 
and its leader Khalidabdul Nabi…numerous Iraq generals [who] were recruited into the 
Yemeni military in 2003…including high level Baathists… [and] veterans of prior 
conflicts in Afghanistan, Chechnya, Bosnia, and other jihadist campaigns.”309 While it 
can be difficult to determine the extent of Salafist influence and participation in the 
military and militias, several very influential regime elites, in addition to Ali Mohsen al-
Ahmar, were publically known to be anti-Zaydi and Salafist sympathizers and 
contributed to instrumentalizing sectarianism. Another prominent anti-Zaydi actor was 
the jihadist and Sunni extremist, Abd al-Majid al-Zindani, who founded and ran the 
Salafist development center, al-Iman University, and was an active Muslim Brotherhood 
member and founder of the Islah Party. Additionally, Muhsin al-Ahmar, who had fought 
with the mujahidin in Afghanistan, was among many PSO and Interior Central Security 
Organization (CSO) leadership officials who were known for their support of 
Salafism.310 Clearly the entrenchment of elites who were dedicated Salafists in the 
military, judiciary, and the intelligence services has had a distressing impact on what 
previously was a unique society of religious pluralism in the Arab Peninsula. 
Furthermore, their presence in the GoY and participation in Sa’ada Wars helped further 
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cement the sectarian narrative against the Houthis through their own actions and the 
actions of the GoY. 
b. Sectarian Instrumentalization by the Houthis 
The Houthi movement has been able to mobilize sectarian group identity by 
propagating clear messages of grievances and community solidarity and by providing 
leadership to mobilize followers. While instrumentalization by elites often implies 
nefariously using identity as a tool to promote and maintain power by elites, in the case 
of the Houthis, this appears to be less of the motivation. Instead, instrumentalizing 
sectarianism has served to preserve Zaydi relevance and those who relied on their Zaydi 
identity for community worth. Thus, by proclaiming to be defenders of Yemeni and 
Zaydi ideals, key individuals and the Houthi group as a whole have maintained 
significance in the community that may have otherwise been lost. This is a subtle, yet 
important, distinction between an instrumentalist who manipulates identity for their own 
power propagation and those, like the Houthis, who use identity mobilization to solidify 
their role and worth in the community. Either way, the Houthis still instrumentalized 
sectarian identity to their advantage and to promote their group identity. 
The instrumentalization of Zaydi grievances into sectarian tensions, and even war, 
was most successfully accomplished by Hussain al-Houthi, the son of a prominent Zaydi 
cleric. Hussain was a key member of both the Believing Youth and the Zaydis political 
party, al-Haqq, but in the early 2000s, became the popular leader of a more outspoken 
group of Zaydis.311 Hussain promoted not just a Zaydi revival against Salafism, but also 
a nationalist movement in opposition to a corrupt Yemeni government, economic and 
political isolation, and Saleh’s support of the United States’ “War on Terror.”312 Al-
Houthi found an audience for his messaging because worsening economic conditions 
coincided with the other pressing issues of Salafist encroachment and the US’s invasion 
of Iraq, all key Zaydi grievances. As oil revenues declined in 2003, the government 
began to further politically and economically isolate previous beneficiaries like the 
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Zaydis in the Northern region.313 Additionally, ongoing efforts by Saudi Arabia to shore 
up the porous Saudi-Yemeni border exasperated economic conditions in the North which 
relied on seasonal cross-border trade routes and smuggling.314 In an effort to ensure 
support (read, finances) from Saudi Arabia, Ali Abdullah Saleh signed the Treaty of 
Jeddah in 2000, permanently giving up its claim of the Jizan, Asir, and Najran provinces 
that shared close familial, tribal, and religious ties with Yemen’s Zaydis.315 Furthermore, 
the north’s comparative economic deprivation became heightened as young Zaydi males 
became more exposed to other areas of Yemen and the greater Middle East.316 Thus, 
though tribal identities were still critical, northern Yemenis began to see common 
predicaments that affected Zaydis as a whole. This created an “imagined community” of 
Zaydi discontent and unity in which al-Houthi was able to instrumentalize.317 Al-Houthi 
combined these pressing northern issues with anger over Saleh’s support of the United 
States’ invasion of Iraq when he publically condemned Saleh’s regime in 2003 at the 
main mosque in the capital of Yemen (Sana’a).318 Hussain delivered a fiery sermon 
decrying the regime and at the end declared what is now the infamous Houthi chant, 
“God is great, death to America, death to Israel, God damn the Jews, victory to Islam!”319 
This slogan would come to represent Hussein al-Houthi’s ideologies, grievances, 
and objectives, and its popularity reflected Houthi’s resonance with many Zaydis and 
Yemenis alike. Al-Houthi’s new slogan also framed his supporters as an action-oriented, 
zealous religious movement that could stand up against the government and could 
motivate a collective action based on a collective identity. The religious element to al-
Houthis messaging was critical in his ability to instrumentalize sectarianism and turn 
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otherwise secular grievances and issues into ones that appeared to threaten the very 
culture and religion of northern Yemenis. The collective Zaydi identity that al-Houthi 
facilitated both greatly enhanced Hussain’s popularity and power, but also promoted 
suspicion by the GoY to al-Houthi’s intensions. Shortly after Hussain al-Houthi’s sermon 
where he first coined the notorious slogan, supporters throughout Sana’a and Sa’ada 
began to graffiti the slogan, anti-regime, and anti-U.S. sentiments on government 
buildings and distribute literature condemning Saleh’s support of the United States.320 
Regime security forces arrested hundreds of Houthi followers321 because they felt the 
slogan was a threat and said that, “If today the Houthis chanted ‘Death to America,’ 
tomorrow they could be chanting ‘Death to the President.’”322 It was both the 
government’s fear of the movement and the Houthi supporters’ opposition to the 
government that lead to armed skirmishes, escalating when al-Houthi and a group of his 
followers were killed in the hills of Sa’ada by the Yemeni Army, sparking the first Sa’ada 
War.323 The Sa’ada Wars, which would last from 2004 to 2010, and Hussain al-Houthi’s 
martyrdom, further activated sectarian identity and heightened the overall sectarian 
tensions in the region. 
The martyrdom of Hussain al-Houthi did not end the instrumentalization of 
sectarianism by Houthi movement elite. Instead, Hussain’s bother, Abdul Malik al-
Houthi, took over as leader of the movement and carried the sectarian messaging onward, 
using Hussain’s martyrdom as a platform of legitimacy. Hussain’s sermons and lectures 
had been recorded and after his death were widely distributed and even converted to 
MP3s.324 This allowed the Houthis to speak with a consistent voice and allowed Hussain 
to further instrumentalize the growing conflict, even from the grave. However, what most 
greatly contributed to the Houthis’ messaging and propaganda were the Sa’ada Wars. 
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The armed conflict with the GoY made it easy for Malik and other Houthi elites 
to assert that “their religion and culture [were] under ideological and physical siege…by 
the GoY itself.”325 The physical ramifications of the GoY’s war against the Houthis 
bonded Northern Yemenis, even those who many not have been Houthi supporters, in 
part because the northern agricultural economic system was tremendously vulnerable to 
war.326 Thus, for Houthi instrumentalization, economic grievances would only become 
even more pronounced after the start of the Sa’ada Wars and contribute to inciting 
sectarian sentiment. The Houthis were able to claim that “the government has destroyed 
the north without rebuilding it,” thereby allowing the Houthis to emphasize the 
“longstanding geographic imbalances in development [and] the GoY’s violation of 
wholesome northern tribal norms, such as respect for protected places and mediation.”327 
Additionally, GoY violence only “activated wider circles of opposition to the regime—
over time, more Zaydis in the north, representing several tribes, began to call themselves 
Houthis.”328 As the war bonded northern Yemenis, Malik and other Houthi elites had a 
wider and more sympathetic audience to propagate their narrative. 
Houthi messaging has always been carefully constructed to fit within the greater 
Yemeni society but still appeal to their Zaydi base of support. In general, the Houthis rely 
on promoting their legitimacy as defenders of both the Yemeni people and Zaydis by 
discrediting the GoY and promoting their own credentials. Much of the Houthis 
instrumentalization of sectarianism in the country has come from their self-declared 
status as mujahidin and defenders of Islamic faith and culture. The Houthis have achieved 
the promotion of their messaging by using both religious symbolism and charismatic 
leadership to enhance group identity. 
The Houthis have promoted a salient group identity through their use of Houthi 
propaganda and rituals. In disseminating their messaging, the Houthis have relied heavily 
on methods that carry strong connotations of Zaydi culture and religion like poems, 
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lectures, and anthems.329 They have then expanded this messaging to younger audiences 
by using web pages, YouTube and Internet videos, web forums, and digital sound 
files.330 The material produced by the Houthis appears to highlight a mix of both peaceful 
and aggressive messaging, done so to target various audiences that reflect the Houthis 
own internal constituencies. For example, in a January 2008 interview, Abdul al-Malik 
says the Houthis first demand was “freedom of thought, expression, and religious 
occasions,” going on to argue that the group aims to “educate our Islamic community 
[about] the culture of the Qur’an.”331 Messaging like this attempted to paint the group as 
a religiously motivated, peacefully insurgency which acts as defenders of Yemeni culture 
and religion. In contrast, and in an appeal to the younger generations of Zaydis, the 
Houthis have also declared themselves as mujahidin, or religious warriors, “capable of 
launching spectacularly devastating, preplanned attacks on GoY forces.”332 In both 
instances, however, the religious credentials of the organization are stressed and 
contribute to the condemnation of the GoY as un-Islamic. This rhetoric solidifies Houthi 
group identity as the religiously righteous one, and the GoY as corrupt and controlled by 
foreigners and non-legitimate forces. 
In addition to message propagation, the Houthis have instrumentalized 
sectarianism by utilizing Shi’a holidays to create a salient group identity. In particular, 
four key holidays served as platforms to gather supporters and engender group solidarity: 
al-Ghadir Day (which, as previously mentioned, is when Shi’a believe Prophet Muhamad 
declared Ali as his rightful successor), the Prophet’s Birthday (which is considered a 
blasphemous celebration by most Sunnis and particularly Salafists), International 
Jerusalem Day (to show solidarity with Palestine), and the Commemoration of Martyrs 
Day (a Houthi invented holiday to honor their fallen warriors).333 This allows the Houthis 
to unite many disparate elements of Zaydis and Yemenis and promote Shi’a religious 
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values as a necessary part of group identity, hence enhancing and instrumentalizing 
sectarian identity as a salient part of anti-regime and pro-Houthi identity. 
The Houthis also rely on key elites, like Abdul al-Malik al-Houthi, to propagate 
Houthi ideology and group solidarity. Though instrumentalism by elites often suggests 
that power and control are independent motivators for elite instrumentalization, declaring 
this as a guiding principle for Abdul’s actions is extremely difficult. While he, and his 
family, have without a doubt benefited from the ascent in power and prestige, this role 
may have been thrust upon Abdul more so than actively sought out. Unlike his older 
brother Hussain, Abdul was very young and rather unprepared to take on the mantel of 
Houthi leadership upon Hussain’s death, and has taken many years to comfortably fill 
this role.334 Additionally, continued military success has forced Malik to be a wanted 
man, having to move often to different fortified safe houses.335 Even still, the Houthi 
group has used Malik to promote the Houthi message. Abdul al-Malik has his own press 
office, sends out email news-letters, interviews with media sources, speaks at key 
holidays and gatherings, and visits war-torn areas to meet followers and offer 
condolences.336 All of these actions are on top of his military leadership responsibilities 
and conducted to enhance his image outside of just his local constituents. Thus, as an 
individual, Malik has helped provide leadership to the Houthi movement, but does not 
appear to be pushing for individual power in the recently established Houthi interim 
government.337 Thus, Abdul al-Malik’s instrumentalization of group identity appears to 
be beneficial for the group as a whole, even if personally the benefits are mixed. 
3. Instrumentalization Conclusion 
Instrumentalization of sectarian identity in Yemen has resulted from actions taken 
by both the GoY and the Houthis. Yet, the actions by the GoY appear to have been more 
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impactful in heightening sectarian tensions than the Houthis because the GoY focused on 
disaggregating identity as a tact for divide and rule while the Houthis have attempted to 
aggregate identity in order to increase their constituency. This is largely due to the fact 
that the Houthis, while benefiting from creating a strong group identity based on religious 
and cultural norms, must also weigh this against ostracizing Sunni Yemenis and limiting 
their support networks. Much of the more recent Houthi rhetoric, particularly from the 
Arab Spring in 2011 through present day, has attempted to broaden its group identity to 
include non-Zaydi Yemenis.338 The GoY, on the other hand, recognized the minority 
status of Zaydi-Shi’a in Yemen, and attempted to exploit sectarian identity as a tool to 
degrade and delegitimize the Houthi movement and prevent the Houthis from gaining a 
wider base of appeal. Both actors, however, have instrumentalized sectarian identity and 
have contributed to sowing the seeds of sectarian discontent and making sectarian 
identity a salient one. 
C. NARRATIVE BUILDING: THE REGIONAL CONTEXT 
While instrumentalism has shown sectarian narrative building in Yemen, 
understanding the greater context of how and why sectarianism became a relevant 
identity in both Yemen and the greater Middle East is best explained by the regional 
tensions between Saudi Arabia and Iran. This regional rivalry has emphasized the Sunni 
and Shi’a identities of both the sponsor states of Saudi and Iran respectively and the 
sectarian identity of their proxy agents. This sectarian identity labeling has been used as a 
tool for identity groups to expand their constitute base and appeal to either Saudi or Iran 
for support, or conversely, by oppositional forces (like state governments) to discredit 
and delegitimize an identity group by claiming it to be no more than a proxy for Saudi or 
Iran. In the case of Yemen, a fundamental part of the sectarian narrative built up against 
the Houthis has been contextualizing their existence in light of the Iranian / Saudi rivalry 
by insisting on the Houthis’ Iranian connections and their anti-Yemeni nature. In doing 
this, by “distancing the Houthis from Yemen,” the GoY has attempted to 
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“internationalize the issue.”339 This framing of the Houthis as a foreign Shi’a proxy of 
Iran has led the GoY to suggest that not only do the Houthis threaten national stability, 
but they also “threaten the regional balance of power” and that “they should be seen as 
part of the Global War on Terrorism (GWoT).”340 This assertion has allowed the GoY to 
gain support from Saudi Arabia and other external actors who oppose Iran in combating 
the Houthis. This section will demonstrate the insubstantiality in the accusation of the 
Houthis as an Iranian proxy, but also show how this greater sectarian rivalry provided the 
context that was critical in shaping the sectarian tensions within Yemen. Thus, the 
conclusion to draw in this section is that sectarian tensions were made relevant and 
heightened by the regional rivalry between Saudi and Iran, but because the Houthis were 
not a true Iranian proxy, the proxy war theory is not sufficient for explaining sectarian 
violence in Yemen. 
One oversight in the accusation that the Houthis are but a Shi’a proxy of Iran is 
that Zaydi Shiism is clearly distinct from the Twelver Shiism found in Iran. One 
particularly important distinction between Zaydi Shi’a and Iranian Shi’a is the Zaydis’ 
disinterest in proselytizing their beliefs. Furthermore, both Zaydi doctrine and most 
Zaydis do not support the idea of wilayat al-faqih or “rule of state by a religious 
jurist.”341 Iranians believe that the Ayatollah is the human embodiment of the hidden 
twelfth imam, something that Zaydis do not believe.342 In fact, Zaydism has moved even 
further away from the idea of a political imam ruling Yemen and instead believe the 
imam should only be seen as a fallible human that can help guide the community on 
religious beliefs alone.343 Furthermore, simply categorizing the Houthis as an Iranian 
proxy because they share, broadly, similar religious beliefs, is a vast oversimplification of 
reality. Peter Salisbury, a Yemeni expert, suggests that it is “tempting to fall into the 
misleading trap of seeing [Yemen’s] various factions as out-and-out proxies for regional 
                                                 
339 Salmoni, Loidolt, and Wells, Regime and Periphery, 171. 
340 Ibid. 




superpowers, malleable to the will of Riyadh or Tehran.”344 The religious differences 
between the Houthis and most Iranians are just one in many differences that separate the 
beliefs, ideologies, goals, and actions of the two. 
Most bothered by these accusations of being an Iranian proxy was in fact Hussain 
al-Houthi and his followers. While it is clear that al-Houthi himself took some 
inspiration,345 even possibly some training, from his time in Iran (though its nature, 
religious or military, is in question), many accounts suggest Hussain al-Houthi was never 
hoping to establish an Imamate or serve as a proxy for Iran.346 Hussain al-Houthi has 
always claimed that the way to bring about the Zaydi revival was to “struggle against 
American hegemony over the Arab and Muslim world and to be satisfied with the Quran 
as the supreme religious authority.”347 His statements against the president, Ali Abdullah 
Saleh were made with the intention of inciting anger against the GoY among all Yemeni 
Muslims, regardless of their sect.348 Shortly before his death in July of 2004, Hussain al-
Houthi wrote an open letter that furiously attempted to rebut the GoY’s accusations of 
foreign connections where he claimed, “His differences stemmed solely from the 
government’s pro-U.S. stance and Saudi policy in Yemen.”349 Even Hussein’s father 
claimed after Hussein was killed that, “Hussein’s objective merely had been to defend 
Islam.”350 More recently, in an April 2015 interview with Frontline, reporter Safa Al 
Ahmad discussed Iranian aid with a senior Houthi leader, Dhayf Allah Al Shami:351 
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Safa Al Ahmad: It has been widely reported that Iran gives the [Houthis] 
weapons, money and training. 
Dhayf Allah Al Shami: It’s not true.  
Safa Al Ahmad: No financial, military, or moral support? 
Dhayf Allah Al Shami: No financial or military. If there is moral support, 
well, we support Chavez in Venezuela. Why this insistence that we 
receive support from Iran, other than wanting to turn the struggle in this 
country and the region into a sectarian one, based on the American and 
Zionist agenda?352 
This insistence on a lack of Iranian support, while disputable as a fact, does 
convey the Houthis insistence on being credible among their Zaydi followers and not to 
be seen as a proxy for Iran. 
Ali Abdullah Saleh understood that linking the Houthis to Iran during the Sa’ada 
Wars allowed him to delegitimize the Houthis’ grievances and obtain more funding and 
support from foreign powers by antagonizing the regional sectarian competition between 
Iran and Saudi Arabia. Through state-controlled media and assertions made by Saleh and 
other GoY elites, the GoY was able to amplify sectarian tensions by creating a fear of an 
Iranian proxy.353 For example, in 2010 after the final Sa’ada War, in which Saudi Arabia 
had militarily supported the GoY with air strikes against the Houthis, Saleh explained on 
a primetime interview on a Saudi Arabian news channel, al-’Arabiyyah: 
[A]l-Houthi now has a foreign ideology: let’s say, [one] based on 
Twelverism, [while] he is Zaydi. We in Yemen are Zaydis and Shafi’is. 
We have no problem [between us]. The entry of the Twelver sect, 
introduced to the Houthis [from outside], is something new. We reject its 
being imposed on our country, or [that] we [should] adopt it. Because for 
thousands of years in Yemen…there is no dispute between Shafi’is and 




Accusing the Houthis of promoting foreign ideologies and sectarian strife allowed Saleh 
to justify his own government’s and the Saudis’ military actions during the Sa’ada 
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In the same interview, Saleh was also asked about the alleged foreign support of 
the Houthi rebels.356 He stated, “More than 80 to 90 percent of [Houthi action] is foreign 
encouragement in order for countries of the region to settle their scores with Saudi 
Arabia, to preoccupy Saudi Arabia, and to send a message to Saudi Arabia via these 
Houthi elements.”357 Saleh’s clear allusion to Iranian meddling provides both the GoY 
and the Saudis justification to engage the Houthis militarily and has helped Saleh secure 
several billion dollars of financing from Riyadh.358 Furthermore, suggesting Iranian 
collusion with the Houthis ties the Houthis into the larger sectarian conflict between 
Saudi Arabia and Iran. However, a “WikiLeaks cable in 2009 confirmed that both the 
United States and Saudi Arabia well understood Saleh’s material calculations and 
strongly doubted Iranian influence in Yemen.”359 Despite this understanding, both the 
GoY and Saudi Arabia recognized the benefit to delegitimizing the Houthis and building 
up the sectarian narrative through the concept of proxy Iranian actors. Furthermore, 
speeches by the GoY, like the one presented, shows that the regional competition 
enhanced sectarianism as an identity worth instrumentalizing and activating. Activating 
these sectarian sentiments contributed to both Zaydi support of the Houthi movement and 
the GoY’s support in their opposition to the movement. 
To explain in further depth why the proxy war hypothesis has limited applicability 
in Yemen for explaining sectarian violence, it is important to consider the evidence 
behind the GoY’s Iranian proxy claims. Unlike the GoY officials, others in Yemen at the 
time of the Sa’ada Wars had different perspectives of Iranian involvement. A western 
diplomat, in an interview with the ICG (International Crisis Group) said, “There is no 
clear evidence of Iranian involvement but small signs of a role by Iranian charitable 
organizations. Overall, however, the conflict (Sa’ada Wars) appears chiefly fueled by 
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internal grievances.”360 Furthermore, when the ICG pressed the GoY for evidence of 
Houthi collusion with the Iranians, the GoY provided documentation of alleged Iranian 
financial, logistical, and ideological support, “raised more questions than they 
answered.”361 The ICG went on to concluded that GoY “Accusations were not 
adequately sourced and often came from unidentified institutions. Overall, the evidence 
appeared incomplete and biased.”362 While some (disputed) assessments on Iranian 
involvement during the Sa’ada Wars still circulate, outside observers seem to have 
conclusively agreed that direct Iranian funding for weapons and support in military 
training was not evident. This lack of Iranian involvement is also critical because it 
demonstrates why the proxy war hypothesis only provides an overly generalized 
assessment of the causes of sectarian violence in the Middle East. On the surface, Yemen 
appears to be an Iranian proxy, but when reconsidered with evidence and a detailed 
evaluation, the nature of sectarian tensions and violence is not so simple and can only be 
explained through the process of narrative building and grievances that this paper 
stresses. 
Despite the lack of direct involvement in sectarian violence, the regional rivalry 
between Iran and Saudi Arabia has clearly contributed to the saliency of sectarianism in 
Yemen. Iran has also taken advantage of this sectarian sentiment and egged on the 
perception of support for the Houthis without actually having to provide serious material 
contributions or engage militarily in the region. Iranian and Lebanese media outlets made 
it a point to “frequently, and not impartially, [cover] the war of Sa’ada.”363 During the 
fifth and sixth rounds of the Sa’ada Wars, support demonstrations were orchestrated in 
Shi’a areas of Iraq and in Iran to support the Houthi rebels.364 Furthermore, Twelver 
Shi’ites issued religious statements of support from the famous hawzat (Shi’a religious 
seminaries) of Najaf in Iraq and Qom in Iran “[condemning] the oppression of Zaydis by 
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the Yemeni government.”365 These statements of spiritual and moral support for the 
Zaydis have benefited Iran by continuing the perception of wide-scale sectarian conflict 
in the region. This has allowed Iran to appear stronger and more capable of spreading 
Shi’a revolutions in its competition with Saudi Arabia for hegemony in the Middle East. 
The influence of the Saudi/Iranian rivalry in the sectarian narrative has truly come 
to a crescendo during the current 2015 Yemeni Civil War, with Saudi Arabian and Sunni 
coalition partners engaging in a full scale military conflict against the Houthis. By this 
point, however, the narrative of sectarianism and a Saudi Arabian versus Iran proxy war 
has long been built; now the narrative is being enacted. It is clear that Saudi Arabia relies 
on the “Iranian bogeyman to forge a coalition of the willing against the conflict-ridden 
and impoverished Yemen.”366 Without the assertion of Iranian intrusion, Saudi’s military 
campaign in the sovereign country of Yemen would be considered an unjustified 
aggression. Additionally, the Saudis now rely on the very sectarian narrative that they 
helped conceive to continue motivating the anti-Houthi coalition and justifying the 
violence perpetrated against Yemeni citizens.367 Ironically, the direct military action of 
Saudis and the GCC has prompted Iran to actually increase their own involvement in the 
conflict and actually support the Houthis. In March of 2015, Iran received Houthi leaders 
in Tehran and openly supported the Houthi delegation when the Deputy Foreign Minister 
promised economic aid to build power plants, provide fuel, and expand ports for the 
Houthis.368 Additionally, the Houthis also generated an aviation contract with an Iranian 
airline to allow flights from Iran into Yemen, something that hadn’t happened in years.369 
Thus, in a way, the GoY and Saudi Arabia were able to actually materialize the very 
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sectarian conflict they had spent so many years purporting already existed. The 
conclusion to take away is that the regional competition between Saudi and Iran has 
distinctly and significantly influenced sectarian sentiments in Yemen, even if the Houthis 
are not a true Iranian proxy. Thus, the merits of the proxy war hypothesis are clearly 
demonstrated in contextualizing the increase of sectarian tensions in Yemen, even if the 
proxy war narrative cannot directly explain sectarian violence. 
D. CONCLUSION 
Yemen’s historical context of sectarian tensions, Zaydi grievances, the larger 
regional sectarian competition, and the instrumentalization of sectarianism by the GoY 
and the Houthis throughout the last decade, have all combined to create a powerful and 
salient sectarian tensions in Yemen. However, as this paper has also demonstrated, these 
contributing factors fail to adequately explain the current sectarian violence in Yemen, of 
which the explanation will be provided in the subsequent chapter. In summary, this paper 
has detailed Houthi grievances, both social and economic, which helped foster an 
imagined community and build a sectarian solidarity. Secondly, when the Houthi 
movement gained momentum through the efforts of key leadership like Hussain al 
Houthi, it presented a credible threat to the GoY’s maintenance of power and patronage. 
Thus, the instrumentalization of sectarianism was one of the methods the GoY used to 
discredit the Houthis because it allowed Ali Abdullah Saleh to deflect Sunni criticism and 
dissent within his own government.”370 Furthermore, the GoY’s instrumentalization was 
disaggregating in nature—it served to isolate the Houthis from the support of other 
elements of Yemeni society by highlighting their religious sect above all other possibly 
shared identities. Thus, the GoY acted to sectarianize the conflict because of political and 
internal dynamics371 more than any particular sentiment they felt against Shi’a in Yemen. 
Nonetheless, the instrumentalization of salient identities, like religion, can have serious 
and complex repercussion on a society particularly when a narrative like the one built in 
Yemen is allowed so much time to fester and is marked with the blood of so many 
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combatants. Further heightening sectarianism has been the regional rivalry between 
Sunni Saudi Arabia and Shi’a Iran, which has served as a backdrop to the local issues in 
Yemen by given saliency to sectarianism as an identity. In many ways, the Saudi/Iranian 
proxy conflict is the structural constructivism while the instrumentalism by the GoY and 
the Houthis is the intentional constructivism. 
The sectarian narrative built up over the Sa’ada Wars from 2004–10 unfortunately 
has not dissipated, but been enhanced as the Houthis have gained strength and 
dominance. Since the Houthis have been so deeply identified within the context of 
sectarianism, the same sectarian based biases have delegitimized their participation in 
important Yemeni events since the Sa’ada Wars such as: their involvement in the Arab 
Spring in 2011; their complaints with the GCC established interim government in 2012; 
and their anger over the unfair power distribution decided in the 2013–14 National 
Dialogue Council. Thus, instead of allowing the Houthis to be a part of the solution to 
Yemen’s ever weakening state institutions, their sectarian labeling has only further 
enhanced their isolation and increased independent actions instead of the group working 
within the greater state collective. Ultimately, this sectarian narrative has cumulated in 
the current conflict between the Houthis and the Saudi Arabian-led coalition as the 
Houthi’s 2014 coup was perceived by Sunnis as nothing more than the reestablishment of 
the Shi’a Imamate and exertion of Iranian power in the Gulf, just as the sectarian 
narrative had been constructed. The Yemeni government collapse in the 2014–15 Houthi 
coup has created new alliances and factions along sectarian lines. Media reports on the 
conflict have suggested motivations for violence along sectarian lines in ways that are 
reminiscent of the Sa’ada Wars, only now; the fight isn’t between the government and a 
rebellious faction, but among Sunnis and Shi’a in the whole country. Ultimately, as the 
state of Yemen becomes weaker, “the absence of a dominant political authority [has] 
created the conditions in which extremism and appeals to religious identity flourish.”372 
Farea al-Muslimi, a visiting scholar from Yemen at the Carnegie Middle East Center in 
Beirut, exemplified how the collapse of the Yemen state has impacted sectarianism in his 
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country when he said, “We have crossed a line. Welcome to Iraq. Welcome to Syria.”373 
The next section of this paper will prove, through the comparison between Yemen and 
Bahrain, how a lack of state capacity allows the entrenched sectarian narratives, created 
by identity entrepreneurs and regional contexts, to be activated into violent sectarianism. 
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IV. STATE COLLAPSE 
Previously, the two case studies of Bahrain and Yemen show how sectarian 
tensions are built, heightened, and promoted, particularly through instrumentalization and 
the regional context of the Saudi/Iranian rivalry. At this point, understanding how these 
tensions can manifest into physical violence, perpetuated along sectarian identity lines, 
requires evaluating state capacity. State capacity is critical in determining whether 
sectarian violence will result. This chapter will argue that while Yemen and Bahrain both 
have elevated levels of sectarian tensions, only Yemen has experienced sectarian violence 
because of its state collapse. To demonstrate this point, the first section will detail 
Bahrain’s state capacity and its ability to quell the Arab Spring uprisings and prevent 
sectarian based violence. Then, Bahrain’s state capacity will be juxtaposed with Yemen’s 
state collapse, explaining the resulting sectarian violence. 
To note, this thesis does recognize the disparity between one of the Middle East’s 
poorest nations, Yemen, and one of its richest, Bahrain. National wealth is certainly a 
contributing factor to state capacity, as is a nation’s geography and demography. Yemen 
has rough, isolating terrain and large unpopulated areas, surrounded by the ocean and 
Saudi Arabia and home to more than thirty million people who are mostly uneducated 
and young. Bahrain only has 1.3 million people living on an island not more than three 
times the size of Washington, DC; all of whom are educated and literate. Despite these 
differences, the preceding chapters of this thesis attempted to demonstrate that Yemen 
and Bahrain share many of the same contributing factors and resulting sectarian tensions 
within their countries. Therefore, a comparison of the effects of state capacity can still be 
made because the analysis is internal to each nation. Meaning, sectarian tensions in 
Yemen have led to sectarian violence because of Yemen’s lack of state capacity, 
circumstances that are independent from Bahrain’s. Thus, though each nation’s contexts 
must be considered internally, conclusions about the importance of state capacity can be 
compared externally. 
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A. BAHRAIN STATE CAPACITY 
Following the Arab Spring uprisings, sectarian violence in Bahrain has failed to 
materialize despite deeply aggravated sectarian tensions within the country and 
population. Though Bahrain’s sectarianism has been fueled by grievances, 
instrumentalization, and the regional environment, the government of Bahrain has 
prevented these tensions from transitioning into violence. The following section will 
describe the aftermath of the Arab Spring on the stability of Bahrain, the population’s 
mobilization toward violence and the acts of violence that did take place, and ultimately, 
the state’s actions that have prevented substantial sectarian violence. 
1. The Aftermath of the Arab Spring 
The GoB’s strategy in dealing with the Arab Spring uprising in Bahrain, detailed 
in chapter two, can be summarized as promoting internal sectarian differences to 
denigrate unifying, anti-government, cross-cutting cleavages among the Bahraini 
population. The Sunni and Shi’a citizens of Bahrain, who initially participated in the 
uprisings of the Arab Spring, did so because of shared political, social and economic 
disenfranchisement. Yet, despite these common grievances between Shi’ites and Sunnis, 
within weeks of the start of the Arab Spring, the protests became overwhelmingly Shi’a-
led. The government’s anti-protest strategies derailed cross-sectarian ties; even “those 
Sunni who were critical of the government’s policies, when forced to choose, sided with 
the state over the Shi’a.”374 This division along sectarian lines stoked intercommunal 
discord and sectarian conflict unknown to Bahrain for many years.375 Jane Kinninmont 
interviewed Bahrainis in the year following the Arab Spring and said that “many 
Bahrainis with different religious and political viewpoints have stated that the social 
fabric has been torn, that sectarianism exists to a degree unprecedented in their lifetime, 
that they have broken with friends from other sects, and that they have heard about 
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‘mixed’ Sunni–Shi’a marriages ending.”376 This torn social fabric led not just to 
friendships ending, but to extremist rhetoric and violent agitation. 
In the weeks and months following the Arab Spring, citizen’s actions and protests 
became increasingly hostile and extremist, suggesting that Bahrain was possibly on the 
brink of sectarian violence. Hostile and enraged Shi’a groups and Sunni counter-
mobilizations were cultivated. Perceptions that the GoB unfairly targeted Shi’a in their 
attempts to quell unrest contributed to the development of Shi’a-extremist groups and 
further heightened sectarianism. A Shi’a-led group, the “14 February Youth Coalition,” 
began using urban violence—burning tires, throwing Molotov cocktails, erecting 
roadblocks, and attacking security forces377—and even established a military wing called 
the “Holy Defense” group.378 Sunni counter-mobilization also became increasingly 
violent and radical as well. Sunni gatherings led to radical splinter groups that adopted an 
anti-Shi’a, rather than pro-government, message.379 Justin Gengler stressed that these 
counter-mobilizations were “inspired by a clear and powerful message emanating from 
all corners of the government-controlled media: resist this attempted coup by deviant 
Shi’a and their master in Iran, or risk the same foreign takeover that befell Iraq in the 
wake of the U.S. invasion.”380 Both Shi’ites and Sunnis acted upon sectarian sentiments 
fueled by the rhetoric and actions of the GoB, and led Bahrain perilously close to 
sectarian violence. 
Though the government initially saw the fomentation of sectarianism as a method 
to suppress a large, unified, anti-government movement, it quickly became clear that the 
sectarian rhetoric was also generating dangerous intercommunal violence and threatening 
Bahrain’s stability. Throughout 2011 and into 2012, radical Sunni and Shi’a groups 
engaged in violent confrontations. In December of 2011, a Shi’a religious precession 
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during Ashura was attacked by a Sunni group founded by Adil Filayfil, a former Bahraini 
intelligence officer.381 Filayfil defended his group’s attacks by stating “his group had 
merely stepped in where the state had failed to act.”382 In April of 2012, after a Shi’a 
group took credit for a pipe bomb that injured seven policemen, a large group of plain-
clothed Sunni men answered an Internet call to “avenge the attack” and descended on 
Shi’a-populated neighborhoods near Manama.383 They came with “knives, sticks, and 
other sharp objects” according to eye witness reports, beating up the residents of the 
Shi’a neighborhoods they came in contact with.384 Furthermore, radical Shi’a groups 
have repeatedly used violent tactics as a part of their strategy to fight an armed resistance 
against the state. These groups have used improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and pipe 
bombs to attack Bahraini security personnel, resulting in the deaths of approximately 
fourteen, according to the Bahraini Ministry of Interior (MOI).385 Extreme tactics used 
by both Shi’a and Sunni groups clearly demonstrates how fraught Bahrain has been with 
sectarian tensions, and how perilously close this island nation has been to full-scale 
sectarian violence. Since 2011, authors writing on Bahrain have been predicting sectarian 
violence, and even war, not dissimilar to that of Syria or Iraq. One author stated “Decades 
of divide and rule in Bahrain is transforming the spectra of sectarian conflict into a 
dangerous self-fulfilling prophecy.”386 Another, even more ominously suggested that “If 
we are not careful,” the situation in Bahrain could “morph into a sectarian bloodbath in a 
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similar vein to Syria.”387 Why then, has the sectarian conflict in Bahrain not developed 
into all out sectarian violence? 
2. The Bulwark of GoB State Capacity 
Ultimately, the inability of sectarian violence to exist outside a few isolated 
incidents is due to the GoB’s state capacity and their ability to repress and thwart. Since 
2011, Bahrain has employed tactics of physical security and institutional control to 
prevent violent rebellion. Bahrain’s security apparatuses used brute force, foreign 
military intervention, and harsh integration tactics. They have also erected checkpoints, 
conducted sweeping arrests and raids, and even destroyed buildings and Shi’ite religious 
sites. Bahrain’s various governmental institutions used the judiciary system, intelligence 
services, and even monitoring equipment to assist in targeting perpetuators and 
eliminating threats to security. 
In the immediate aftermath of the February 2011 riots and since, the GoB 
implemented harsh security measures that limited the capacity of sectarian tensions from 
spiraling into sectarian violence. The Bharani security forces abruptly and aggressively 
attempted to end protest by firing tear gas, rubber bullets, and birdshot into crowds, even 
killing a few civilians.388 On March 14, 2011, King Hamad al Khalifa declared a three-
month state of martial law and enlisted the support of Sunni Saudi troops, augmented by 
UAE ground forces and Kuwaiti naval vessels, to help impose a state of emergency, 
curfew restrictions, and protest control.389 The foreign military support helped facilitate 
“mass arrests, a curfew, a ban on rallies, and a general crackdown on those seen as 
sympathetic to the protests.”390 Saudi and Bahraini tanks were placed in the center of 
                                                 
387 Ralph Leonard, “Bahrain’s Sectarian Tensions and America’s Mysterious Silence on the 
Oppressive Regime,”  Opinion, None of the Above (NOTA), February 24, 2016, 
https://notanetwork.org/2016/02/24/bahrains-sectarian-tensions-and-americas-mysterious-silence-on-the-
oppressive-regime/. 
388 Frederic M Wehrey, Sectarian Politics in the Gulf: From the Iraq War to the Arab Uprisings 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 2013), 77. 
389 Ibid., 81. 
390 Ibid. 
 94 
Manama and the GCC forces stood guard over vital installations in Bahrain.391 The 
government also bulldozed the Pearl Roundabout and its iconic monument—the 
gathering place and symbol of the Arab Spring—to make a very clear point about the 
GoB’s capacity to end the uprising.392 
The GoB has used its considerable security forces to physically suppress the 
population. The police and military have set up an extensive network of police and 
military checkpoints across the city to prevent freedom of movement or congregation, the 
majority of which are staged at the entrance to Shi’a villages and still exist today.393 
These checkpoints have facilitated the arrest of nearly 3,000 people for crimes ranging 
from “insulting the king”394 and attempted murder for throwing Molotov cocktails at 
police,395 to charges of “conspiring to overthrow the Bahraini government”396 and 
“carrying out terrorist crimes.”397 Since 2011, the GoB has destroyed a total of 53 Shi’ite 
religious sites,398 an act that received international condemnation, even from President 
Barak Obama.399 The Government has also greatly stepped up its utilization of swift and 
forceful policing tactics, employing riot control for funeral precessions and holidays, 
especially the anniversary of February 14, the date of the original Arab Spring protest. 
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These very strict measures have reasserted the GoB’s control of Bahrain physically; 
making clear that controls the streets. 
The GoB has also demonstrated its capacity to prevent sectarian violence through 
its sophisticated institutional enforcement and reach. After the initial days of protests, the 
government fired public employees suspected of participating or sympathizing in the 
protests. This equated to roughly 3.6% of the Bahraini workforce, or nearly 4,600 people, 
the majority of whom were Shi’a.400 Another 250 people have had their Bahraini 
citizenship permanently revoked, again, the majority of who are Shi’a of Persian 
descent.401 The GoB also utilized the judiciary system to target dissidents; in 2012, the 
government officially made it illegal to hold public protests,402 increased the jail penalty 
for “insulting the king” from two up to five years,403 and began prosecuting people over 
anonymous twitter comments tracked by utilizing IP spy links.404 Additionally, the MOI 
and the National Security Agency’s (NSA’s) intelligence services purchased cellphone-
spying capacities from Western companies like Nokia-Siemens Networks.405 This has 
allowed the NSA to acquire short message service (SMS or text) transcripts of suspected 
protestors that have been used during interrogations and judicial trials.406 Intelligence 
services have also been successful in uncovering weapons and bomb caches, like the 
1.4 tons of high-grade explosives, rifles, and hand grenades found in an underground 
vault just south of Manama in September of 2015.407 Reporters and scholars in Bahrain 
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have also noted that a “ubiquitous network of CCTV cameras” now adorns buildings and 
street corners in large numbers, making the MOI’s constant monitoring quite apparent.408 
The GoB has demonstrated a pervasive and profound capacity to monitor, regulate, and 
restrict citizen activity and prevent violence. 
Overall, Bahrain’s security forces and state institutions make up a highly capable 
state apparatus that has been able to control violence and protests effectively in Bahrain. 
The effect of this state capacity gives Bahrain the general appearance as a peaceful and 
stable country.409 As one reporter noted, “Bahrain has fallen into a political lull since the 
latest crackdown on activists…one suspects that there is simply no one left to protest who 
hasn’t already been arrested, been driven into hiding, or fled Bahrain entirely.”410 The 
physical policing and harsh judicial responses imposed by the GoB has effectively halted 
the development of sectarian violence in Bahrain. 
3. Conclusion 
In conclusion, the lack of sectarian violence in Bahrain is not due to a lack of 
sectarian tensions or conflict—Bahrain has even been considered a primary spark of 
sectarianism in the Middle East.411 Instead, Bahrain has escaped the fate of sectarian 
violence that has befallen Iraq, Syria, and now Yemen, due to its immense state capacity 
to stop and prevent violence through physical security forces and state institutions. As 
Toby Matthiesen, a Middle East scholar who was in Bahrain during 2011, remarked, 
“Guns and tanks are very effective tools to stop revolutions, particularly if…the soldiers 
are loyal to the regime and international pressure on the regime is limited.”412 Thus, as 
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Matthiesen points out, regime capacity proved instrumental in determining the outcome 
of the Arab Spring in Bahrain. 
While Bahrain demonstrates the effectiveness of state capacity in preventing 
sectarian tensions from becoming sectarian violence, this conclusion should not be 
extrapolated to generally assume that state repression, regardless of its abuses, is 
condoned or even inherently effective. Bahrain is a small island nation with a particular 
geography, demography, and institutional capacity that is favorable for state control. 
Because Bahrain has a small population, statically, this reduces the physical number of 
people that the government would have to contend with in an opposition movement, and 
this number is reduced even further when considering what percentage of opposition 
voices would even be willing to engage in illegal or violent activity. Adding in the 
nation’s particularly tough gun laws and the difficulty citizens have in obtaining 
weapons, the state’s ability to quell rebellion, unrest, and violence may be comparatively 
easier than in other nations.413 Nonetheless, considering Bahrain as a microcosm can still 
be very useful in demonstrating the true stopping power of state capacity in preventing 
sectarian violence. 
It is equally important to conclude that the prevention of violence and the 
resolution of sectarian conflict are two distinct things. If anything, the actions taken by 
the GoB has further fomented sectarian strife and conflict within Bahrain, it has just 
failed to manifest beyond clandestine and isolated incidents of hostility due to the state’s 
repressive capacity. Additional efforts by the GoB will be necessary if Bahrain is to truly 
end its sectarian conflict. 
B. YEMEN STATE COLLAPSE 
Sectarian violence in Yemen has become a growing reality in the wake of state 
collapse. Yemen’s particular state demise was a process that started dramatically in the 
wake of the 2011 Arab Spring and then slowly continued to decay as a result of the 2014 
Houthi invasion and subsequent 2015 anti-Houthi military campaign led by Saudi Arabia. 
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Though Yemen’s state was never strong to begin with—central authority lacked real 
control in some of the provinces and separatist and terrorist groups existed within this 
frame for decades—there still remained a level of functionality that prevented large scale 
identity violence, provided institutional services, and facilitated systems of patronage.414 
In other words, though dysfunctional, the Yemeni state prior to 2011 had both legitimacy 
and capacity. The Arab Spring’s uprisings led to the ousting of President Ali Abdullah 
Selah, and subsequently terminated 33 years of social, political, and economic contracts. 
This section on Yemen will detail the impact of state collapse and demonstrate 
that as the state’s institutions and social contracts were broken, identity conflict was 
heightened. The first section will detail how the state’s collapse reordered alliance 
structures along sectarian lines. The second section will demonstrate how the lack of state 
capacity facilitated the strength of non-state actors like the Houthis and AQAP, further 
heightening sectarianism. The third section will detail the incidents of sectarian violence 
that resulted from state collapse, and lastly, the impact of external actors will be detailed, 
particularly how the Saudi Arabian-led coalition against the Houthis has bolstered 
sectarian violence and terrorist groups’ capacity. 
1. New Sectarian Alliances 
The Arab Spring, and the process of state collapse, caused a reordering of 
alliances along sectarian identity. Prior to the 2011 Arab Spring, President Ali Abdullah 
Saleh had a skilled system of divide and rule in which his regime “functioned as long as 
there was enough money to maintain the patronage networks and provide ordinary 
Yemenis with the hope, if not reality, of a better life.”415 Yet, the 2011 termination of 
President Ali Abdullah Selah ended the dominant social contracts, alliances, and state 
institutions he had maintained. As Beverly Crawford has stressed, when old social 
contracts are broken during times of state collapse, the odds of identity conflict and 
violence are increased.416 Thus, Yemen was particularly susceptible to identity conflict 
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because of its deeply entrenched tribal, familial, and regionally based systems of 
patronage that were critical to how the state functioned and how power and wealth were 
transmitted.417 
The impacts of state collapse on society, and prior instrumentalization and 
grievances that had heightened sectarianism, caused new alliances to form along sectarian 
identities. First, state collapse generated a societal reordering of salient identity groups as 
national identities became insignificant and resulting security and power vacuums 
encouraged new identity group cohesion. Second, new alliances were formed along 
sectarian identities because of the variables that had fostered sectarian tensions, as 
detailed in chapter three. To recap, sectarian tensions were fomented by activated 
sectarian based grievances in the Houthi community, identity entrepreneurs 
instrumentalizing sectarianism, and the regional rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia 
that further emphasized sectarian identities. 
The Ali Mohsen/al-Ahmar/Islah alliance and AQAP alliances with Sunni tribes, 
which were both formed in the wake of state collapse, demonstrate both the saliency of 
sectarianism and the impact of state collapse on group identities. To be certain, sectarian 
identity is not the only identity these new alliances shared in common—tribal, familial, 
regional, and anti-regime identities were also important. However, Yemen had not been 
known as a nation where sectarian identity held enough importance to trump or facilitate 
new alliance groups; yet suddenly it did. In part, these new alliances turned the “peaceful 
social intifada” of the Arab Spring into a “widespread, violent confrontation among 
military units, tribal forces, and militants” and heightened sectarian divisions.418 
a. Mohsen/ Ahmar/ Islah Alliance 
The Arab Spring activated internal divisions which had been brewing, the most 
notable of which was the split between President Saleh and three powerful actors; 
General Ali Mohsen, the al-Ahmar family, and the Islah political party.419 All three 
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groups, though they had previously held overlapping interests, were not directly linked 
outside of their shared patronage with or support of Ali Abdullah Selah. Yet, after the 
Arab Spring, all three groups became linked by two critical factors; one, their 
competition for power with Ali Abdullah Selah, and two, their adherence to Sunni Islam. 
As background, the various connections these groups have with one another, Saleh, and 
the Houthis will be described. 
General Ali-Mohsen is the half-brother of Ali Abdullah Saleh and commanded 
the Army’s First Armored Division that fought the Houthis during the Sa’ada wars.420 In 
fact, the Sa’ada Wars have even been called “Ali Mohsen’s War,”421 because of his 
advocacy within the GoY to keep fighting the Houthis. Mohsen was also known for his 
connections with Salafist Sunni groups422 and his recruitment of Salafist extremists to 
help fight against the Houthis.423  
The al-Ahmar family is the head of the largest and most powerful tribal 
confederation, the Hashid, and is the same tribe that Ali Abdullah Saleh hailed from.424 
The Ahmars are ideologically closely linked with both moderate Sunnis and Salafists, but 
prior to 2011, avoided any kind of direct confrontation with the Houthis outside of tribal 
disputes.425 Both the Hashid tribe and the Bakil tribe—the tribe most Houthis come 
from—are regionally located in Northern Yemen. Sheikh Abdullah Bin Hussein al-
Ahmar, the leader of the Hashid tribal confederation until his death in 2007, also worked 
very closely with Saudi Arabia and was a founding member of the Islah party.426  
The Islah political party is considered Yemen’s version of the Muslim 
Brotherhood. At times it has represented a counterweight to Saleh’s political party, the 
General People’s Congress (GPC), while other times, it has sided with the GoY and has 
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been the direct recipient of patronage and funding.427 Islah has always been known to 
shelter more extreme Sunni Salafists among its ranks, though broadly speaking; it was 
better described as a “tribal-Islamist force” than a Salafist political party.428 Additionally, 
at times, even Zaydis have worked with Islah, “either hoping to benefit from kin network 
affiliations or out of grievance with the GPC.”429  
Prior to 2011, the relationships and connections between these groups and among 
other actors like the Houthis or Ali Abdullah Selah were fluid and facilitative toward 
various identity needs. Meaning, tribal, familial, and regional identities facilitated 
connections among and between actors. After 2011, however, sectarian identity became a 
more impactful link, cementing alliances and isolating others. Since 2011, an alliance 
between “Islah, Ali Mohsen, and the Ahmar family leadership,” was formed, predicated 
on the fact that they “are all Sunni Muslims and are ideological and political opponents of 
the Houthis.”430 Thus, the sectarian unity of their relationship became relevant as a result 
of state collapse and the end of Saleh’s patronage. As will be discussed, this directly 
resulted in sectarian violence. 
b. AQAP Alliances 
State collapse, coupled with the real and perceived threat of Houthi expansion 
south and east, has shifted alliances in the south toward sectarian identities to the benefit 
of AQAP. Prior to the start of state collapse in 2011, Yemen had informal “popular 
committees” that were largely comprised of tribal militias and that worked closely with 
the GoY to combat AQAP expansion and presence in Yemen.431 However, the issues that 
have coincided with state collapse, like the fracturing and ineffectiveness of the Yemeni 
Armed Forces, increased poverty, unemployment, and economic turmoil, and especially 
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the lack of government authority, have reduced the capacity of the popular committees 
and fostered new Sunni based alliances.432 
AQAP has taken advantage of state turmoil to reassert itself and swell its ranks by 
focusing on sectarian identities.433 On January 28, 2011, AQAP’s deputy leader, Abu 
Sufyan al-Azdi, proclaimed it was every Yemeni Sunni’s duty to take up arms in defense 
of the apostate Shi’ite Houthis.434 Focusing on sectarian identity has allowed AQAP to 
“exploit the sectarian side of the Yemeni conflict.”435 AQAP has worked to facilitate 
these new sectarian alliances by changing some of its extremist tactics and offering 
advanced and highly capable fighters’ services in order to be more palatable to local 
Sunni tribes.436 Acting as the military arm of these local Sunni tribes and unrelentingly 
attacking Houthi targets has enhanced AQAP’s image as “the ‘real’ protector of the 
Sunni tribes against the ‘Shi’a aggression’” and has both bolstered recruits and enabled 
new alliance formation.437 These sectarian alliances have allowed AQAP to gain 
sympathy and infiltrate a strange conglomeration of Sunni tribal militias, anti-Houthi 
fighters, and southern separatists. For example, Ziyad al Majdali, the head of the al-
Bayda Tribal Alliance,438 said he believed he had a religious duty to fight the Houthis.439 
Though Majdali is firm that he is not al-Qaeda, he pointedly said, “As a Sunni southerner, 
I can never accept the Houthis. Let me be honest. Even if al-Qaeda and I have 
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disagreements, if we’re fighting in the same trenches against the Houthis, he becomes my 
brother, my bother in arms.”440 This is the sectarian sentiment that has grown into 
forming sides in violent confrontations, and has been facilitated by sectarian discourse 
and fueled by state collapse and insecurity. 
2. Increased Strength of Non-State Actors: the Houthis and AQAP 
The Houthis have capitalized on the collapse of the Yemeni state to further their 
organizational strength, political clout, and territorial occupation. As an ICG report 
stated, the “most obvious factor in Houthi territorial gains [was] the significant 
weakening of state authority following the 2011 uprisings.”441 The Houthis used the 
chaos of the Arab Spring as an opportunity to reorganize and bolster their military and 
political strongholds in the Sa’ada governorate, positioning them for expansion 
beyond.442 The Houthis also capitalized on the political power vacuums created by the 
divisions within the GoY elite to expand their base of popular appeal outside of 
Sa’ada.443 The Houthis calculatedly backed the Arab Spring youth movement in Sana’a 
and vocally condemned the GCC’s November, 2011 brokered peace deal and newly 
formed “consensus government.”444 The Houthis’ outspoken opposition to the GCC deal 
resonated with many Yemenis who were aggravated that the Arab Spring had only served 
to re-entrench corrupt elites, strengthen external actors, and cripple internal security.445 In 
the months following the Arab Spring, the Houthis made efforts to stress their Yemeni 
identity, as opposed to their Shi’a or Zaydi identity, to encourage support. However, their 
actions in the subsequent years following the Arab Spring became increasingly sectarian 
and facilitated widespread sectarian violence. The political and security power vacuums 
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caused by the Arab Spring allowed the Houthis to bolster their military and political 
strength, popularity, and capacity. 
Al-Qaeda also was able to consolidate strength and capacity as a result of the 
2011 Arab Spring. Specifically in the early months of the Arab Spring turmoil, the 
“diversion of security forces toward containing public demonstrations led to the 
escalation of Al-Qaeda’s activities in the country, with AQAP joining forces with Ansar 
al-Sharia and seizing control of important cities and strongholds in the South.”446 The 
state’s lack of stability greatly enhanced AQAP’s strength as their militants, who had 
been busy fighting off GoY troops, were now free to re-equip and grow. To demonstrate 
their enhanced capacity, AQAP staged two attacks in Sana’a in the year following the 
Arab Spring; a dramatic attack against the presidential palace the day President Hadi was 
sworn into office, killing 26 republican guards, and another, only a few months later, 
which killed another 96 Yemeni soldiers.447 Like the Houthis, AQAP was able to take 
advantage of the frustration and disenfranchisement of many Yemenis in the South and 
Eastern parts of the country, where AQAP has since operated quite freely. 
3. Sectarian Violence in Yemen 
The failure of the National Dialogue Committee (NDC) and initial reform 
attempts in Yemen after the Arab Spring led to sectarian violence as it became clear to 
aggrieved groups, like the Houthis, that they would see no meaningful changes. After the 
initial chaos and government collapse caused by the Arab Spring, outside powers, 
particularly the GCC, and Yemen’s old elites, attempted reform efforts in the hopes of 
quelling further unrest. As a part of the reform process, the NDC was established and was 
comprised of representatives from multiple parties who were to negotiate conflict 
settlement and draft a new constitution.448 Among the many issues with the NDC and 
interim government, the primary problem was that “At every stage in the NDC planning 
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process, inclusivity was scuttled in favor of the embedded interests of established 
partisan, military, and tribal figures.”449 Thus, for those Yemenis who had supported the 
Arab Spring in the hopes of reform, the NDC’s members suggested that stability and 
change were unlikely—of the 565 NDC delegates, “the Houthis were given only 35 seats 
and only 20% were granted to youth activists that had been instrumental in the 2011 Arab 
Spring.”450 Additionally, the process was slow moving despite the critical deterioration 
the country was experiencing in levels of unemployment; water, food, and petrol 
shortages; and violence and instability. Furthermore, “when it came time to draw the 
boarders of the new federated Yemen, the GCC selected interim president, Abd Rabbuh 
Mansur Hadi, appointed a special, unelected committee and did not include any 
representation from youth activists, al-Hirak, or the Houthis.”451 The proposed borders of 
the new federated Yemen split the south in two, angering al-Hirak, the Southern 
separatists, and carved up Houthi territories, preventing them any access to the sea or any 
share in Yemen’s oil and gas resources.452 As the NDC came to its scheduled end in 
September of 2013, violence and clashes were re-sparked in frustration and anger over 
the seemingly wasted time spent and the perception of unfair results. As it became clear 
the NDC was failing and that further state collapse seemed inevitable, violence and 
sectarianism rose. 
In the summer and fall of 2013, sectarian violence between Houthi and Salafist 
fighters drastically increased as competition for power and territory continued in the 
wake of NDC failures and the state’s continued collapse.453 Capable and determined, the 
Houthis had used the time since 2011 to regroup and were now focused on establishing 
the changes the NDC had failed to deliver, increasing their own strength, and gaining 
territory. In the north, sectarian identity steered the conflicts. In 2013, the Houthis sieged 
a Salafist religious institute, Dar al-Hadith, in Dammaj, Sa’ada. This action quickly 
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escalated the fighting into two distinct sides—the Houthis and their Shi’a Zaydi 
followers, and a conglomerate of Sunni Salafist fighters, and members of the al-Ahmar/ 
Islah/ Ali Mohsen alliance.454 Dar al Hadith had long been a symbol of Saudi/Salafist 
intrusion into the Houthis religious homeland. Thus, the battles at Dammaj represented a 
larger underlying Shi’a versus Sunni sentiment and served as the spark for the sectarian 
conflict that would engulf the north of Yemen.455  
Throughout the fall of 2013 and well into 2014, from the border of Saudi Arabia 
in the town of Kitaf, Sa’ada; all through the governorates of Jawf, Hajja, and Amran; and 
even down to the very edges of Sana’a, sectarian battles occurred (see map below).456 
The combatants on both sides of these battles had clear sectarian delineations; even local 
AQAP members joined Salafist militias in fights against the Houthis and their 
supporters.457 Hussein al-Ahmar, the new head of the al-Ahmar family and Hashid tribal 
committee, actively urged the elimination of the Houthis and pledged his tribesmen 
would shed the blood of anyone trying to associate with them.458 In Hajja, Jawf, and 
Arhab, the Houthis fought against Islah-affiliated tribesmen while in the Amran 
governorate, al-Ahmar fighters were assisted by old members of Ali Mohsen’s 310th 
Army brigade.459 Throughout this time, the Islah/ Ahmar/ Mohsen Sunni alliance clearly 
presented itself in action, displaying sectarian rhetoric and targeting Houthi fighters. In 
both Kitaf and Dammaj, Sunni Salafist religious institutes were used to stockpile 
weapons, money, and fighters, demonstrating the use of Sunni Salafist ideologies to 
promote violent confrontation against the Houthis.460 Though exact accounts of 
armament and capacity of these religious institutions is under scrutiny, reporters who 
visited these sites after hostilities pointed out that “the students in this area were not just 
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studying the Quran.”461 The sectarian battles in the North of Yemen took place 
specifically because the GoY was unable to stop them.462 
 
Figure 8.  Governorates of Yemen463 
Despite the state’s feeble attempts at ceasefires in early 2014, the lack of real state 
capacity only led to further intensifications of sectarian violence. For the Houthis, the 
second assassination of a Houthi NDC representative further concreted their perception 
of an existing security dilemma and power vacuum, and enhanced their sectarian group 
cohesion and resolve. Furthermore, during this time, the state’s economy continued to 
collapse as violent clashes disrupted oil production. In 2014, revenues from oil exports 
fell by 37 percent as foreign oil companies abandoned operations in Yemen.464 
Considering that between 2000 and 2009, “the hydrocarbons sector, including refining, 
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accounted directly for 20–30 percent of Yemen’s overall gross domestic product (GDP), 
80–90 percent of its exports and 70–80 percent of government revenues,” a loss of nearly 
40% of its productivity in 2014 was devastating for Yemen.465 It became increasingly 
clear for the citizens of Yemen that the state was no longer capable and the need for 
identity group protection and cohesion was paramount. 
Throughout 2014 and into 2015, sectarian violence throughout the whole country 
was amplified as the state continued to deteriorate and Houthi aggression and momentum 
increased. In the fall of 2014, the Houthis momentum led to their take-over of the capital, 
Sana’a, the forced house arrest of President Hadi, and the continued expansion of Houthi 
militants into the governorates south of Sana’a. These critical actions only further 
heighted sectarian violence in the country, particularly in battles against AQAP and the 
Sunni tribal militias who stood in opposition to what they saw as a northern invasion by 
Houthi Shi’a apostates.466 For example, Jamal al-Awlaqi, a tribal fighter in the southern 
Shabwa governorate, stated that he was fighting the Houthis because “they are a 
sectarian, northern group, aided by Iran that wants to occupy our lands.”467 Thus, as the 
GoY’s military presence continued to dwindle in the south and eastern provinces, the rise 
of armed Sunni tribal alliances became more apparent in the security vacuum left. Where 
the GoY was absent or incapable of providing stability and defense, sectarian groups 
were forged in opposition to the perceived Shi’ite Houthi takeover of Yemen. 
While sectarian violence had initially been limited to northern areas of the 
country, the continued expansion of Houthi militias southward has bolstered sectarian 
extremists groups, specifically AQAP, AQAP’s affiliate, Ansar al-Sharia, and the Islamic 
State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS).468 IEDs, suicide bombers, assassinations, ambushes, and 
violent engagements by these extremist groups have grown in frequency and intensity 
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since 2011. In April of 2014, ISIS claimed one of the most violent suicide attacks in the 
Middle East. It took place at two Shi’a Zaydi mosques in Sana’a and resulted in over 140 
people killed.469 Since 2011, Houthi group consolidation and sectarian identity has been 
enhanced as nearly monthly ambushes, attacks, and targeted explosions have occurred in 
Houthi strongholds all over Yemen. 
The Houthis have responded to these attacks on their sectarian identity by 
expanding their territory and preemptively engaging opposition groups, framing their 
actions as necessary to protect minority Shi’ites against Salafist aggressors, foreign 
jihadists, and terrorists.470 While the Houthis have often attempted to depict themselves 
as an inclusive group, fighting for the defense of Yemenis against corruption and foreign 
transgressors, their rhetoric still stimulates sectarian identity divisions as a part of who 
they define as “us” and “them.” For example, in February, 2015, the leader of the 
Houthis, Abdel Malik al-Houthi, made a speech to his followers justifying Houthis 
expansion into the southern governorates because “The Islah Party is cooperating and 
allying with al-Qaeda in Marib, Shabwa and other areas. Islah seeks to spark sectarian 
disputes. This clearly happens in Taiz and other places. This is an illegitimate and filthy 
tactic which harms the Yemeni people.”471 Speeches like these by the Houthis 
demonstrate that sectarian discourse was used to heighten group cohesion and justify 
violent actions against Sunnis. The Houthis have decisively activated sectarian identities 
in order to distinguish friend from foe and legitimize Houthi expansion. As one Houthi 
member, Abdel Malik al-Ijri, claimed in an interview with Reuters, “The largest element 
in the pro-Hadi militias was al-Qaeda.”472 These claims made by Houthis precipitate a 
notion that the Houthis must expand in order to defend themselves. While the perceived 
threats the Houthis speak to may be exaggerated, in the midst of state collapse and the 
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resulting security dilemmas, this rhetoric and aggressive mobilization is expected. State 
collapse has triggered the sectarian mobilization and violent interactions of both Sunni 
and Shi’ites alike. 
4. External Sectarian Actors 
Starting in March of 2015, the Saudi Arabian-led military campaign against the 
Houthis has sealed the fate of the Yemeni state and further entrenched sectarian 
identities. Since aerial bombardments, naval blockades, and military operations were 
commenced by the Saudi-led coalition, the Yemen state has faced perilous conditions. 
Oxfam International estimates that some six million Yemenis are on the brink of 
starvation,473 and as of January 28, 2016, 5,500 deaths and nearly 27,000 injuries have 
resulted.474 Furthermore, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 
(OCHA) estimates that nearly 80% of all Yemenis (about 21.1 million people) are in 
need of humanitarian aid or protection,475 and in 2015, Yemen ranked seventh out of 178 
countries on the Fragile State Index, below even Iraq, Syria, and Afghanistan.476 Thus, 
Operation Decisive Storm has only deepened the chaos of state collapse and heightened 
sectarian rhetoric. 
While many have argued that the incidents of sectarian violence prior to 2015 
were local contestations for power, the new external involvement by actors in the Middle 
East along clear sectarian lines has drawn sectarian identity even deeper into the conflict 
in Yemen. It is hard to ignore that all of the GCC coalition governments that are 
participating in Operation Decisive Strom are Sunni and all of them are supporting 
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President Hadi, a Sunni himself.477 One author suggested that Saudi Arabia has 
stimulated the “Shi’a versus Sunni dichotomy as a critical factor in rallying support 
against the Houthis.”478 In a comprehensive study of sectarianism on social media by the 
Carnegie Institute, the start of Saudi-led hostilities in Yemen correlated to drastic spikes 
in sectarian language in the online sphere.479 The report found that the “most dramatic 
spike in tweets containing anti-Shi’a terms in the period under study occurred following 
the first airstrikes in Yemen in late March, 2015, as the Saudis launched Operation 
Decisive Storm.”480 The report stated that “as fighter jets from Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, 
Kuwait, Morocco, Qatar, Sudan, and the UAE joined the Saudi-led operation in Yemen, a 
kind of pan-Sunni zeal swept through the region.”481 Moreover, the governments of Iran, 
Hezbollah, and Iraq came out in opposition to the GCC actions and in support of the 
Houthis, decisively solidifying sectarian identities and validating Saudi aggressions.482 In 
the wake of state collapse in Yemen, a new battlefield has been created in which regional 
sectarian actors have come to exacerbate local sectarian discourses and state weaknesses. 
Thus, regional sectarian actors have served to further heighten sectarian violence in 
Yemen. 
Sectarian violence in Yemen has also increased as a result of the Saudi-led 
military efforts against the Houthis because it has indirectly aided and emboldened Sunni 
extremists. Many scholars have claimed that Al Qaeda and ISIS have been the real 
winners in Yemen’s war as the Saudi-led coalition’s primary targeting of the Houthis, 
and not AQAP or ISIS, has provide space for these extremist organizations to grow in 
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popularity and territory.483 As one author noted, since 2015, “this multi-front war in 
Yemen is a gift to groups like AQAP and the Islamic State. Both organizations thrive in 
areas where poverty and sectarian tensions are pronounced.”484 As of March 2016, 
AQAP holds more territory than that it did in 2011 (see image below) when the group’s 
regional control had reached its peak among the turmoil of the Arab Spring uprisings.485 
Furthermore, al Qaeda has since become an incredibly deadly force in Yemen—the 
American Enterprise Institute (AEI) Critical Threats Project tracked over 110 attacks in 
just a fifteen-month period that AQAP was responsible for.486 Most estimates suggest the 
number of attacks have only increased in the past few years as AQAP has gained further 
strength and territory from which to conduct operations.487 
                                                 
483 al-Muslimi, “The Popular Committee Phenomenon in Yemen: Fueling War and Conflict.”; 
Longworth, “Yemen: Intractable Conflict and the Growth of Extremism.”; Peter Salisbury and Ahlam 
Mohsen, “The Rise of the Islamic State in Yemen,” Vice News, July 20, 2015, 
https://news.vice.com/article/the-rise-of-the-islamic-state-in-yemen.; Yaroslav Trofimov, “Is Al Qaeda 
Winning in Saudi-Iran Proxy War in Yemen? Concerns Arise after Islamist Extremists Fought Alongside 
Saudi-Led Coalition and Its Allies,”  The Wall Street Journal, September 10, 2015, 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/is-al-qaeda-winning-in-saudi-iran-proxy-war-in-yemen-1441877581. 
484 Horton, “Capitalizing on Chaos: AQAP Advances in Yemen.” 
485 Ludovico Carlino, “Anarchy across Southern Yemen Likely to Facilitate AQAP’s Unopposed 
Expansion into New Areas, Including the Coast,”  IHS Jane’s 360, February 16, 2016, 
http://www.janes.com/article/58047/anarchy-across-southern-yemen-likely-to-facilitate-aqap-s-unopposed-
expansion-into-new-areas-including-the-coast. 
486 Cody Curran et al., “AQAP and Suspected AQAP Attacks in Yemen Tracker 2010, 2011, and 
2012,” AEI Critical Threats April 10, 2016,  http://www.criticalthreats.org/yemen/aqap-and-suspected-
aqap-attacks-yemen-tracker-2010.  
487 Oren Adaki, “AQAP Claims 149 Attacks in Yemen since Late September,”The Long War Journal, 
December 19, 2014, http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2014/12/aqap_attack_map.php. 
 113 
 
Figure 9.  AQAP’s Gains in Yemen as of 2016488 
Pro-Islamic State militants have also been organizing themselves in wilayats since 
2014, reportedly reaching seven as of early 2016.489 Additionally, since March of 2015, 
the Islamic State has carried out at least 29 attacks, killing at least 389 people.490 The 
governorates in which IS occupies a presence coincide with territories AQAP has a 
strong presence in as well. For the same reasons AQAP gained popularity, IS too is 
“enjoying some popular support in the predominantly Sunni areas, and especially in areas 
that have suffered the atrocities of the Houthis and their allies. The IS-affiliated factions 
thus are welcomed as protectors from such transgressions.”491 Thus, for both IS and 
AQAP, the Saudi-led strikes, the collapse of the state, and the increased sectarian framing 
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of the conflict has bolstered their image as Sunni defenders, enhanced their capacity to 
inflict sectarian violence, and united Sunni groups in opposition to the Houthis. 
 
Figure 10.  Islamic State’s Wilayats492 
5. Conclusion 
In conclusion, state collapse in Yemen has facilitated the rise of sectarian violence. 
State collapse has precipitated security dilemmas and power vacuums that have pushed 
Yemenis into decisively sectarian divisions in search of protection and group cohesion. This 
has led to new alliances forming on the basis of sectarian identity, has enhanced the support 
and capacity of groups along sectarian lines, and has facilitated external actors pushing 
sectarian agendas and rhetoric. Therefore, the success of groups like the Houthis and Al-
Qaeda has largely been as a result of their sectarian appeal and the increased support this 
identity has provided them among co-religionists. Sadly, Yemen has been transformed from a 
place that traditionally had seen very limited importance placed on sectarian identity to one 
fully immersed in the complexities and consequences of sectarian violence. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
This thesis has attempted to explain the rise of sectarian violence in the Middle 
East by evaluating four independent variables in a comparison of Yemen and Bahrain. 
The four IVs that have been explored, and their contributions duly explained, have been 
grievances, elite instrumentalization, the regional proxy war between Saudi Arabia and 
Iran, and state collapse. By examining the impact of these variables in both Yemen and 
Bahrain, it has become clear that the two nations share three of the four IVs, and only one 
of them, Yemen, has experienced sectarian violence. Thus, the conclusion that can be 
drawn from these observations is that sectarian tensions have been created in both nations 
due to grievances felt by the Shi’a populations in each country; the sectarian 
instrumentalization of these grievances by elites, primarily the government regimes in 
each country; and that the sectarian nature of this “divide and rule” strategy imposed by 
the governments has been shaped by the regional context of the competition between 
Sunni Saudi Arabia and Shi’ite Iran. Furthermore, the key variable absent in Bahrain but 
present in Yemen has been state collapse, thus suggesting that Yemen’s sectarian 
violence has been created by sectarian tensions that have transformed into sectarian 
violence due to the consequences of state collapse and the ensuing political and security 
vacuums. 
This research has attempted to articulate that sectarian violence in the 
contemporary Middle East is not mono-casual, and that suggesting so is in fact a 
weakness of current theories used to explain sectarian violence. Instead, the combination 
of aggrieved populations, state agency, regional competition, and state collapse has 
supplied the context for why sectarianism, as opposed to other identities, has become so 
salient and conflicting. Furthermore, understanding how the independent variables 
explored are more formidable in combination than as standalone variables can prevent an 
incorrect application of this work in other areas. Meaning, though this thesis has stressed 
each IV as a critical component in the creation of sectarian violence, this does not imply 
that any nation that experiences one of these variables, like state collapse, will simply 
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disintegrate into sectarian or identity based violence. Therefore, it is the combination of 
variables that appears to be necessary in the creation of sectarian violence. 
While this research has also highlighted the importance of state capacity in 
preventing sectarian tensions from becoming violent, the conclusion to be drawn is not 
that the harsh hand of the state, as in the case of Bahrain, is a consistent policy direction 
worth pursuing to prevent violence in other areas. Bahrain’s distinctive circumstances; 
their small population, isolated geography, and incredible state wealth, has allowed them 
control over their population that may not be feasible in other circumstances. Considering 
that Bashar al Assad’s regime in Syria attempted a similar harsh government crackdown 
to quell Arab Spring unrest has only further exacerbated violence and instability, this 
research is not suggesting state capacity is the only thing between stability and violence. 
To reiterate, each nation’s circumstances with conflict, sectarianism, and violence must 
have corresponding individualized considerations and policy solutions, even if the 
process of how sectarian violence is created can be generalized. 
Additionally, this thesis has specifically focused on the Middle East, instead of 
sectarianism in general, because there are specific factors in the region of the Middle East 
that have influenced how and why sectarian violence has been created that may differ 
from sectarian conflict in other regions of the world. The deep religious and cultural 
history of Islam in the Middle East has contributed to identity mythmaking and saliency 
in a particular way. The primacy of authoritarian regimes has given greater agency and 
capacity to elite instrumentalists than may exist in other regions or contexts. The (largely) 
ethnic homogeneity of the region has limited the mobilizing power of ethnicity in the 
propagation of violence, directing the conflict in the Middle East toward sectarianism in 
ways that might not occur in other regions that have ethnic divisions to contend with as 
well. Lastly, the competition between Saudi Arabia and Iran, though the effects of which 
have reverberated in other nations outside of the Middle East, has more greatly affected 
the Middle Eastern region. The contestation for regional hegemony is felt specifically by 
the nations upon which this competition is taking place in, and that has been largely 
limited to the Middle East. Therefore, the current issues surrounding sectarian violence 
that have been explored are particularly applicable in the Middle East. 
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When scholars write on sectarianism, they typically consider it as a “subset of 
ethnicity.”493 However, this dynamic is not as applicable in the Middle East; sectarian 
identity is important and standalone, not as a subset of culture or ethnicity. This 
distinction of sectarian conflict from ethnic conflict is important because it can help 
spawn tailored solutions for sectarian conflict resolution. In other words, applying 
conventional ethnic territorial accommodation solutions, like partition or secession, to the 
sectarian issues of the Middle East, may be unwise or simply not applicable. Therefore, 
for conflict and policy solutions in the Middle East, this thesis has attempted to provide 
narrow and content specific details, yet for the greater understanding of sectarian 
violence, this thesis has hopefully contributed a theoretical process that can be adapted to 
other cases of identity conflict. 
A. POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS  
Solutions that address sectarian conflicts in the Middle East must be nuanced and 
specific to the nation and area under duress. If anything, this thesis has tried to stress the 
contextual importance in understanding sectarian violence, and this same lesson of 
contextualization should be applied to policy applications as well. Solutions possible in 
Yemen will be different than those proposed in Bahrain, or even Syria or Iraq. 
Additionally, while this thesis considers identity as a constructed phenomenon, it also 
acknowledges the primordialists’ argument that identity, once made salient, is very 
resilient to change, especially after identity conflicts.494 In short, blood matters, and this 
region has seen a lot of bloodshed over sectarian identity. Recognizing the resiliency of 
identity hopefully discredits policy solutions that attempt to simply ignore or abolish 
sectarian identity. However, on the other hand, sectarianism’s current saliency should 
also not result in policy solutions that attempt to fortify sectarianism as a paramount 
identity beyond the memory of conflict nor diminish the space for other identities to 
exist. A balance between recognizing the importance of sectarian identity without 
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entrenching its societal divisions is a critical one to strike. Therefore, this thesis does not 
advocate partition or consociationalism as potential solutions to sectarian violence in the 
Middle East because both solutions would result in a permanence of sectarianism that 
would most likely not be beneficial to the long term stability of the region. 
B. POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND SOLUTIONS IN YEMEN 
The peace talks currently underway for conflict resolution in Yemen are a 
necessary and important step in ending the violence and destruction of the Middle East’s 
poorest country. While both the conflict and its resolution are still very much an ongoing 
process, exploring possible policy implications in Yemen for the US, and establishing 
lessons learned, can be very useful. The most critical conclusion to draw from Yemen’s 
sectarian conflict is it has been preventable. Yemen was largely a nation void of 
sectarianism prior to government instrumentalization, external imposition, and state 
collapse. While the Zaydis have certainly exhibited considerable fortitude as a group over 
time, for nearly a thousand years in fact, their identity has not been in conflict with other 
Yemenis or the existence of Yemen until recently. The Zaydis as a group, though largely 
independent and regionally defined, have not suggested territorial partition as a part of 
their goals or ideology. Their Yemeni-ness has been paramount in their image building as 
a group, despite current events overshadowing this aspect of their identity in favor of 
their sectarian nature. Thus, this thesis suggests that the recognition of multiple identities, 
like that of the Zaydis, is critical, but should not be done so at the expense of a shared 
nationalism or patriotism. 
Reintegration of the opposing groups in Yemen through a unifying leader or 
parliamentary system would be a more lasting solution to rebuilding a post conflict 
Yemen. Cementing sectarian identities, which have been inconsequential in the past, 
reduces the ability for them to become inconsequential in the future. Therefore, instead of 
considering partition or consociationalism as ways to solve the sectarian violence in 
Yemen, solutions of reintegration, limited regional autonomy, like federalism, or simply 
better guarantees of minority rights and participation in the central government, could 
adequately address grievances and facilitate conflict resolution. Many of the Houthis’ 
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issues have stemmed from general grievances of government corruption, lack of 
representation, and inadequate state capacity to provide for its people; these same issues 
have also been articulated by many other Yemenis including those in the South. Finding a 
moderate voice in government that can be acceptable for both the Zaydis and the rest of 
Yemen would be a necessary first step to ending conflict and reintegrating Yemenis into 
a united nation. 
1. Policy Implications for the United States 
The United States should emphasize conflict resolution, not continuation, in 
Yemen. Reconsidering the support the U.S. has provided to its ally, Saudi Arabia, in 
Saudi’s prosecution of war in Yemen, would be a wise decision and may help end the 
sectarian violence and turmoil in Yemen. Not only would this be beneficial for the lives 
of the Yemenis affected, but it would allow the U.S. to refocus on arguably one of the 
most fretful impacts of Saudi Arabia’s campaign on Yemen, the rise of AQAP and ISIS. 
Both extremist groups have greatly benefited from the lack of government prosecution, 
the general chaotic, lawless atmosphere, and the flowing sectarian rhetoric. Both groups 
have increased their recruitment base, their territorial control, and their capacity to 
conduct terrorist operations. The war has also, though not completely, limited the US’s 
ability to prosecute these terrorist groups in Yemen. In combination, a stable, non-
sectarian Yemen is a better proposition for the United States. The perception of threat the 
Saudi’s have repeatedly insisted upon from Iran, though Yemen, has failed to materialize. 
Instead, what has materialized is a humanitarian and terrorist crisis, the effects of which 
will impact the nation of Yemen, the Middle East as a region, and even the United States 
for some time. 
C. POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND SOLUTIONS IN BAHRAIN 
While state capacity has prevented all out sectarian violence in Bahrain, the 
sectarianism that has been activated in the country requires discussion for solutions and 
alleviation. Lessons from other developed and capable states in dealing with identity 
crisis, like that of the United Kingdom and the IRA, can demonstrate that ongoing 
identity based insurgencies that target both the state and other identity groups can be very 
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detrimental and impactful for society. While a civil war and the calls for partition were 
prevented by England’s own capable state, much like Bahrain, eventually bringing an end 
to the continual violence required negotiations and inclusions of the very groups the 
government was at first unwilling to work with. The situation in Bahrain might call for 
similar diplomatic negotiations to end the low-level Shi’a violent resistance. While the 
GoB is justified in believing that violent resistance must be met with harsh repression, it 
would behoove them to consider that there still are real grievances felt by a large portion 
of their population and that negotiating with opposition groups may be the only realistic 
solution to ending the violence and discontent of their citizenry. Additionally, the GoB 
must recognize that having a large part of the capable and even moderate voices of the 
opposition movement imprisoned and unable to participate in reasonable negotiations has 
driven opposition groups to more radical and violent forms of rebellion. Reconciliation 
and negotiation should therefore be restarted with the moderate and capable groups, like 
al Wefaq, and earnestly attempt to solve the issues the past attempts at negotiations faced. 
One possible solution to facilitate negotiations is soliciting the support of outside 
mediators, like the United Nations. Having impartial parties present can help address 
some of the politically and culturally sensitive grievances that have led to past talks 
failing. Furthermore, this would give the GoB further legitimacy in the eyes of the 
international community that they are taking serious steps toward conflict resolution. As 
a part of these international dialogues, also fully implementing the changes the BICI 
recommended, even if promised in an incremental fashion, would also be a critical show 
of commitment by the al Khalifa regime toward reconciliation. 
The partition or secession of parts of Bahrain are simply not feasible solutions to 
the sectarianism in Bahrain. The economy and land mass could not reasonably facilitate 
any type of division. The reality for Bahrain is that the rulers and their constituents all 
live on a very geographically small and isolated island nation; assimilation or non-
territorially based autonomy solutions are more plausible solutions. 
Power sharing is also not a reasonable solution for Bahrain. Consociationalism 
only really works when the ruling power is in a state of weakness and agrees to share 
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power with other elites to facilitate an end to conflict.495 This is certainly not the case in 
Bahrain, and the GoB has clearly demonstrated its hesitation to relinquish any of its 
power. If anything, the conflict in Bahrain has refortified the GoB’s state capacity and 
determination to not allow Shi’a groups a larger say in the government. The solutions to 
conflict in Bahrain must start small and eventually require the GoB to give certain 
concessions. This relinquishment of control may only happen either after a long duration 
of violent resistance, like in England with the Irish Republican Army, or with the 
encouragement from outside powers, like the international community or the United 
States. 
Thus, while the GoB has the nation largely under control, not taking more 
meaningful steps to address the slow, simmering, resistance within their own small nation 
could impact their economy and livelihood. Because Bahrain is competing with Dubai to 
be a financial capital of the Middle East and heavily relies on foreign participation, from 
Saudi’s weekend visits to Manama, the Formula One races, or even the United States’ 
stationing of the 5
th
 Fleet, ending the Shi’a violent resistance becomes critically 
important. One IED targeting tourists, U.S. sailors, or business centers might irreparably 
damage the Bahraini economy. For these reasons, Bahrain has a vested interest in 
preventing a terrorist attack in Manama or a resurgence of protests and conflict in their 
streets. 
1. Policy Implications for the United States 
The United States must balance short term with long-term stability in Bahrain in 
their policy decisions. Understandably, the U.S. has primarily been concerned with unrest 
in Bahrain because of Bahrain’s relationship as a close ally, their purchasing of U.S. 
weapons systems, and most especially, their housing of the U.S. Navy’s fifth fleet. 
Nonetheless, the U.S. actions toward Bahrain have largely favored short term stability 
over long term solution building because of the United States’ immediate concerns with 
base security and because of the U.S. desire, at the time, to move forward with the Iran 
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nuclear deal. The U.S. decision to remain largely silent on Bahrain’s response to the Arab 
Spring, however, maybe have been at the expense of long term stability that will be 
harder to remedy as opposition groups become further entrenched and Bahrain’s 
resistance remains ongoing. Public backlash against the U.S. position in Bahrain has 
already generated much condemnation by Bahrainis; this could potentially lead to 
violence targeting U.S. base instillations or U.S. military personnel. Due to these risks 
and the potential long term instability of Bahrain, the U.S. should use its leverage to push 
for reconciliation talks in Bahrain. Now that the Iran nuclear deal has been mostly 
finalized, the U.S. should refocus on encouraging its ally to address the underlying 
problems in Bahrain and to address their severe humanitarian missteps. The longer the 
situation in Bahrain continues unresolved, the harder reconciliation will be as opposition 
demands become more entrenched and unreasonable. 
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